On Nov. 29, the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) adopted a resolution demanding Iran to continue and extend its suspension of uranium enrichment activities. While the resolution welcomed Iran's decision to suspend the activities, it expressed ``strong concern'' over its repeated violations of a safeguards agreement on nuclear nonproliferation that bans extraction of enriched uranium and plutonum up to October 2003.

As a result, the Iranian nuclear crisis could be avoided for the time being. However, once the ``suspension'' is lifted, the situation could well flare up.

Iran has continued to claim its ``right to peaceful use'' of nuclear energy as recognized by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). It allowed the entry of cameras to monitor its uranium enrichment facilities but refused to seal down.

One of the governors called Iran's case the most difficult ever. Article 4 of the NPT recognizes the ``inalienable right'' of all signatories to the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Iran did not exactly violate the NPT.

However, if no measures are taken to check Iran's activities, it is for sure that the country would advance its nuclear capability. The case exposed a basic contradiction of the NPT system.

In hindsight, perhaps the heyday of the NPT system was around 1995, when its indefinite extension was decided on.

Later, the system started to develop cracks as demonstrated by events that rocked the world. They include India's and Pakistan's nuclear tests in 1998 and the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States. Cracks were also visible when revelations centering on Pakistani nuclear scientist Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan and nuclear black market activities came to light earlier this year.

Proposals to reform the NPT system have been made by various circles.

Nonproliferation regulations should be applicable not only to governments but also to companies and individuals.

The right to peaceful use of nuclear material should be re-examined. In particular, the use of highly enriched uranium should be banned for peaceful purposes.

Acquisition and sale of nuclear technology on the black market should be made illegal.

However, none of these is easy to materialize.

In defending its nuclear fuel cycle program, Iran reportedly pointed out that it is unreasonable that Iran is not allowed to do what Japan is doing. Currently, Japan is the only non-nuclear power that has a reprocessing program to extract plutonium on a major scale.

Japan and Iran are not the same. In the first place, Japan has a transparent, crystal-clear non-nuclear policy. It is not an oil producer. China and India's demand for oil and gas is expected to explode. With advanced global warming, nuclear power generation will be increasingly important to Japan in the future. Therefore, it must strengthen its nuclear fuel system.

The Japanese Cabinet and the Atomic Energy Commission recently concluded plans ``to maintain the existing nuclear fuel cycle.'' It means the government gave an official seal of approval for the nuclear reprocessing plant in the village of Rokkasho, Aomori Prefecture, to go into operation.

But the existing nuclear fuel cycle that burns reprocessed plutonium in fast breeder reactors to produce more plutonium has suffered a setback because of high costs and accidents.

Tests using real spent fuel are scheduled to start as early as next year at Rokkasho. When and if they do in fact get under way, the world will turn an exacting eye to Japan.

Despite its three non-nuclear principles not to produce, possess or introduce nuclear weapons and open inspections on nuclear substances, Japan already possesses large quantities of plutonium. Rokkasho could become an object of international criticism as a symbol that gives Japan a ``special status.''

It could also give an unneeded excuse to ``suspected nuclear powers'' such as Iran and North Korea.

The IAEA is studying plans to diversify and internationalize an entity to undertake the production of substances to be used for nuclear fuel as a means to guarantee peaceful use of enriched uranium programs of Iran and other countries. But Rokkasho could put a damper on the attempts.

In September, Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi delivered a speech to the United Nations General Assembly stressing Japan's experience as ``the only country ever to have suffered nuclear devastation.'' He stated how ``Japan has been at the forefront in promoting nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation'' and expressed Japan's determination to become a permanent member of the Security Council.

He explained how Japan can play a role different from that of the five permanent members that possess nuclear weapons.

I give him credit for his enthusiasm. But there is a gap between ``the only country to have suffered nuclear devastation'' and ``the only major non-nuclear power that possesses plutonium.'' Japan must be more sensitive that the world warily sees the gap as Japan's ambiguity.

What is lacking in Japan's nuclear fuel policy is consideration from the viewpoint of diplomacy and security, in particular non-nuclear activities, counter-proliferation and disarmament in East Asia.

It is time for Japan to reconsider how its nuclear fuel system and nuclear non proliferation diplomacy ought to be. Next year's conference to review the NPT is an ideal opportunity to flesh out its policy. In particular, Japan is urged to consider the following three possibilities:

Leave Rokkasho's administration to a multilateral and international framework in the future;

Discuss ways to use nuclear energy to promote regional peace and stability with China, South Korea, Russia and other neighboring countries;

At the same time, urge nuclear powers to tackle nuclear disarmament in earnest.

Also in order for Japan to stay ``at the forefront'' in promoting nonproliferation diplomacy, it should temporarily freeze the Rokkasho project. (2004/12/07)