Lingering frictions haunt Japan-South Korea ties

BY IZUMI SAKURAI AND KOICHI KOSUGE

THE ASAHI SHIMBUN

Lee Myung Bak took office as South Korea's new president on Feb. 25. As the nation's first president to have experience as a corporate CEO, the 66-year-old former Seoul mayor and CEO of Hyundai Construction faces high expectations from the public in revitalizing the economy.

A photograph of a student demonstration hangs in the office of the "Group of 6-3 Comrades" in Seoul.(IZUMI SAKURAI)

As prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi held historic summit talks with North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in Pyongyangn in September 2002, which resulted in the Pyongyang Declaration.

Hyun Syng Il

Yoo Young Nyol

After winning the election Lee, referring to historical issues over Japan's past actions, including colonial rule, said, "For the sake of mature relations between South Korea and Japan, I really do not want to tell (Japan) to apologize and repent."

"Issues of history should be left for experts to discuss," he added.

Unlike his predecessor Roh Moo-hyun, who often used harsh language when referring to Japan, there are mounting expectations in Japan that bilateral relations with South Korea will improve.

Just a little more than 40 years ago, Lee was an anti-Japan activist while he attended the elite privately run Korea University. He opposed normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan, took part in demonstrations, was arrested, and spent time in jail.

Korean students 'insulted'

On June 3, 1964, tens of thousands of students and members of the public held a protest rally in Seoul.

They shouted slogans such as "The Park government should resign for the sake of the people" and "Overthrow the corrupt and incompetent Park government."

President Park Chung Hee had quit the military the previous year. Fearing the student-led movement would turn against his own government instead of protesting diplomatic normalization with Japan, he invoked martial law and used military force to suppress the protests.

Why did the public oppose the normalization of bilateral relations?

The Asahi Shimbun interviewed former Kookmin University President Hyun Syng Il, who was a student leader of Seoul National University at that time.

"The general view was that settling past colonial rule with only a few hundred million dollars was unacceptable," said Hyun, 66. "It was the abyss of a humiliating foreign policy." Nearly 20 years had passed since South Korea was liberated from Japanese rule at the end of World War II. "Everyone still had painful memories of colonial rule," Hyun said. "Due to their ethnic pride, people could not accept such a deal."

There was also widespread antagonism against Park, who seized control of the government in a military coup.

In April 1960, Syngman Rhee, the country's first president, was forced to step down following student and public demonstrations over his efforts to cement his dictatorship.

"People had thought that Rhee's resignation would bring about democracy, yet a coup took place after about a year," said Hyun. "Park depended on foreign powers like Japan and the United States to try to solidify his power base. It gave the impression that he was selling out the country for his own benefit."

Yoo Young Nyol, 67, who headed the protest movement at Soongsil University, now serves as chairman of the National Institute of Korean History.

"When the two countries normalized their diplomatic relations, people thought that Japanese companies would overwhelm the Korean economy. They thought that the Japanese economy, which boomed because of the Korean War, would crush South Korea," Yoo said.

Hyun and Yoo were among those who joined protests against South Korea's decision to normalize diplomatic relations with its former colonial ruler. But these days, they no longer favor scrapping the Japan-South Korea treaty.

By the same token, few of their peers from the protest era advocate such a move, either, they said.

Their views of the authoritarian Park have also changed. Hyun was arrested on insurgency charges. Later, however, he moved to the United States, where he gained a Ph.D. in sociology and became a university professor.

He later became a member of the national assembly for the conservative-leaning Grand National Party.

"I don't hold a grudge against Park any longer," said Hyun. "He was a dictator, but there were also some good things about him. My views on him have changed due to our country's economic growth."

Lee, the new president of South Korea, joined Hyundai Construction after graduating from university. He became president of the company when he was just 35 years old.

"Times have changed since then," said Hyun. "Lee must be trying to move forward with regard to relations with Japan, instead of clinging to the past."

Yoo, meantime, put his student campaign experience to good use by studying history to explore past flickerings of democracy in South Korea. He studied Japanese and spent a year and a half in Japan doing research.

"As I lived in Japan and encountered friendliness and sincere approaches among Japanese at first hand, my views of Japan changed," Yoo said. "Though there are problems in the details of diplomatic normalization, establishing diplomatic ties with Japan turned out to be a good thing in the end.

"The two countries are destined to be neighbors. We have to communicate with each other for better understanding, and think about how to compensate for things that were lacking in the process of diplomatic normalization."

Back then, as soon as students were set free, they established the Group of 6-3 Comrades encompassing universities across the nation.

The name refers to June 3, the day of the decisive protest. Members are still in touch with each other, even to this day.

When we visited the group's office in Seoul, a large picture of students clashing with police was hanging on the wall. An employee of the office explained that the members had made a concerted effort to support their old cohort Lee Myung Bak in the presidential election held at the end of last year.

Japanese students also protested

On June 22, 1965, after 14 years of negotiations, the basic treaty normalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries was signed along with four related pacts.

For years afterward, many Koreans harbored ill feelings about Japan's apparent lack of remorse for its harsh colonial rule.

Finally, though, a breakthrough came during a summit meeting in October 1998 between then Korean President Kim Dae Jung and then Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi.

Obuchi expressed sincere apologies for Japan's past actions, and Kim forthrightly acknowledged the progress of "postwar Japan," thereby confirming the importance of understanding each other's history.

The following month, a ministers' conference between the two countries was held in Kagoshima, and then South Korean Prime Minister Kim Jong Pil, now 82, visited Japan. When Kim was director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency, he played a key role in establishing diplomatic relations by negotiating with Masayoshi Ohira, then foreign minister and later prime minister, and others in the administration headed by Hayato Ikeda, on reaching a settlement on claims for $300 million in grants and $200 million in loans. The document is known as the Kim-Ohira memo.

On his way home, Kim asked to speak at Kyushu University in Fukuoka. It was an unusual gesture, based on a feeling of being indebted to the university for hosting so many graduates who played major roles in the creation of South Korea. His 45-minute lecture was in Japanese.

"I thought that the extraordinary situation (the lack of diplomatic relations) was not good; not only for bilateral relations but also for stability, peace and prosperity of the entire Asian region," Kim said. "I put my political life on the line for diplomatic relations despite strong criticism at home."

We visited Kyushu University to meet Shoji Ishikawa, a 63-year-old professor who was involved in organizing and running the lecture as the dean of law.

"Even though it was a request from a nation's prime minister, when considering the role Kim played in South Korean politics, I had a personal dilemma," Ishikawa said.

When Ishikawa was a student at Saga University, he joined in a campaign against diplomatic normalization between Japan and South Korea.

"I thought normalization would represent a revival of Japanese imperialism where its flow of capital tries to reach out to its past colony," said Ishikawa. "To my mind, Japan's ruling class did not recognize its responsibility for colonial rule at all. I felt they supported Park Chung Hee's military dictatorship while being a junior partner in the alliance with the United States, trying to give themselves a new lease on life.

"Above all, I questioned whether Japan should join hands with South Korea (to the exclusion of North Korea)."

Many students at that time shared similar thoughts, he explained.

Ishikawa also knew some Korean students residing in Japan who, driven by idealism, moved to North Korea.

"I felt sympathetic to North Korea because it appeared to have independence and legitimacy, despite various problems at that time. My feelings for South Korea, which was in the grip of dictatorship, were different because of the way it caused problems for the ordinary people," Ishikawa said.

Kim Sok Pom, an 82-year-old Korean writer living in Japan, recalled attending protest meetings organized by Chongryon (General Association of Korean Residents in Japan) day after day.

"The Park government was pro-Japan and a traitor to the Korean people. The United States was prodding South Korea to quickly join hands with Japan, and that was absurd," he said.

U.S. pressure during Cold War

The proposed Japan-South Korea Treaty passed in a Lower House plenary session in November 1965 after the chamber's speaker made a motion without advance notice. It was approved by the Upper House the following month. The Japan Socialist Party, Komeito, the Japanese Communist Party and other opposition parties boycotted the proceedings.

"There are three faces to the normalization of diplomatic relations," said Kwon Okie, 75, who covered the issue as a Tokyo correspondent for the Korean newspaper Dong-A Ilbo.

In his view, they are:

・The settlement between neighboring countries regarding the colonial past and the establishment of new relations;

・U.S. actions with regard to the Cold War; and

・Park's aspiration to get money for economic development.

"You cannot just pick one thing to explain Japan-South Korea relations," said Kwon.

We also interviewed Lee Won Deog, a 45-year-old Kookmin University professor and authority on Japan-South Korea negotiations.

He explained there were two driving forces that brought the negotiations to an agreement. The first was security logic.

"To effectively contain the communist block in the Cold War era, the United States tried to politically and economically connect Japan and South Korea in the face-off with North Korea," Lee said.

In 1961, North Korea signed mutual assistance treaties with China and the Soviet Union.

"Pressure from the United States peaked following its full-scale intervention in the Vietnam War and China's successful nuclear test in October 1964."

Another factor was Washington's rationale concerning the economy.

"The United States was trying to gradually reduce economic assistance to South Korea and have Japan take over," Lee said. "The Park government put top priority on economic development, but it had no money or technology. It had to bring the negotiations to an agreement to access money from Japan."

The negotiations developed quickly.

"The issue of accountability for colonial rule, the principle theme, was left behind, and that became the starting point of repeated future strife over history issues," said Lee.

"However, it is questionable if the current prosperity would have been achieved if South Korea had insisted on justice over history at that time," he said. "We should have a multifaceted view of history."

Prime Minister Kim's lecture led to the establishment of the Research Center for Korean Studies at Kyushu University. Despite his specialization in European political history, Ishikawa became the first director of the center. He explained that diplomatic normalization between the two countries was a historical task that had to be fulfilled.

At the same time, he also believes that the logic of opposing normalization at that time was not wrong, because Japan did not seriously face up to the issues of history, a situation that has not really changed to this day.

"Japan is at the crossroads now as to whether to continuously depend on the Japan-U.S. alliance as in the past or to take the initiative to search for co-existence in a diversified Asia," said Ishikawa.

There is at least one difficult and grave issue that Japan certainly faces--how to normalize relations with North Korea.

Kim Jong Pil (1926-)

Military officer and politician in South Korea. He graduated from the Korea Military Academy. He participated in the military coup along with Park Chung Hee in 1961. Under Park's leadership, Kim led negotiations for the normalization of Japan-South Korea diplomatic relations as the first director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA). He served as prime minister from 1971, and visited Japan with a personal letter from Park in 1973 at the time of Kim Dae Jung's abduction in which the KCIA was believed to be deeply involved, apologizing to then Japanese Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka. Japan agreed to conclude an investigation (the first political resolution). In 1998, he became prime minister again under President Kim Dae Jung. He stayed at the center of South Korean political circles for a long time, playing a part in the "politics of the three Kims" along with Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam. He served as president of the Korea-Japan Parliamentarians' Union and was a liaison between the two countries, but he lost in the 2004 general election.

Fact File: Diplomatic normalization talks between Japan and South Korea (1951-)

Normalization negotiations between the two countries started with preliminary talks in 1951, followed by the first full session in 1952, The negotiations lasted about 14 years until a final seventh session. Negotiations stumbled and broke down with long halts, partly due to comments from Japan seen as justifying the colonization of Korea (such as Japanese chief delegate Kanichiro Kubota's remarks in 1953).

On June 22, 1965, the Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea (basic treaty) was signed in Tokyo along with four related agreements:

・An agreement concerning the settlement of problems in regard to property and claims, and economic cooperation;

・An agreement concerning fisheries;

・An agreement concerning the legal status and treatment of citizens of the Republic of Korea residing in Japan; and

・An agreement concerning cultural properties and cultural cooperation.

The basic treaty took effect in December that year.

However, a territorial dispute over the Takeshima islets, known as Tokto in Korean, was shelved. South Korea considers that the islets are not even subject to an exchange of notes to resolve disputes.

Fact File: Japan-South Korea Basic Treaty (1965)

Due to clashes between the two countries over colonial rule and other issues, vague expressions remain in the treaty. Article 2 declared that "it is confirmed" that all treaties and agreements concluded between the two countries on or before Aug. 22, 1910 (the date when the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty was signed), "are already null and void." South Korea insisted that the Annexation Treaty and the Second Japan-Korea Convention in 1905 that stripped South Korea's diplomatic rights and made it a Japanese protectorate were matters forced upon Korea against the backdrop of Japan's strong military power, and said they were invalid from the outset.

Japan took the position that the agreements were legal, and they became void with the establishment of South Korea in 1948. The basic treaty avoided making any reference as to when the agreements lost their effectiveness.

Article 3 says, "it is confirmed that the government of the Republic of Korea is the only lawful government of Korea ... ." As for the area of South Korean jurisdiction, Japan considered it to be to the south of the military demarcation line between North and South Korea, while South Korea claimed the entire Korean Peninsula.

Fact File: Japan-North Korea negotiations (2002)

The Pyongyang Declaration signed by then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and North Korean leader Kim Jong Il in September 2002 says that Japan "expressed deep remorse and a heartfelt apology" regarding its colonial rule.

As for a settlement, the declaration states that Japan would provide North Korea with economic cooperation after the normalization of bilateral relations including grant aid, loans and humanitarian assistance, following the basic approach between Japan and South Korea.

While it also confirms the principle of waiving all claims, North Korea maintained the position that issues including forced recruitment and taking women to serve as "comfort women" were separate matters.

Fact File: Agreement concerning the settlement of problems in regard to property and claims, and economic cooperation

In the agreement, Japan promised to give South Korea $300 million in grants and $200 million in loans. Both were provided in Japanese products and services by Japanese people over 10 years, and they were used to construct Pohang Works (today's POSCO), the highway connecting Seoul and Pusan, the Soyang River Dam, and other projects.

With regard to property claims, rights and other issues between the two countries, the agreement states that it "confirms" they "have been settled completely and finally."

Japan left personal compensation for requisitions and the draft under Japan's colonial rule to South Korea, settling the matter in the form of economic aid. Therefore, compensation and financial aid for "comfort women," Korean forced laborers and others were not taken into consideration at that time and became a major issue later.

In the 1970s, the Park government established domestic legislation for compensation for individuals, and paid surviving families of about 8,500 deceased victims of forced mobilization 300,000 won each, but that covered only a fraction of the affected people. The Roh Moo-hyun government placed priority on examining history, surveying Japan's forced mobilization, and passed legislation in 2007 to pay 20 million won (about 2.3 million yen) each for the dead.

According to the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization under the Japanese Imperialist Republic of Korea, there have been about 220,000 claims, and 11,442 deaths, 625 missing people, 1,237 injured, and other damages have been acknowledged.(IHT/Asahi: March 28,2008)