POINT OF VIEW/ Jun M. Yamazaki: Japan impotent if Somalia hostage crisis arises

As a 20-year veteran of a British crisis management consultancy firm specializing in international kidnap and other security crises, I have some experience in handling such matters.

Last year, I started my own crisis management consultancy firm. Among the wide variety of cases brought to my attention, recent requests for advice on the Somali piracy problem are significantly increasing.

On June 19, the proposed bill on measures to deal with piracy passed the Diet. The new law allows Maritime Self-Defense Force ships more flexibility in the use of their weapons. However, it is only the first of many steps ahead of us to resolve the problem effectively.

Given that 2,600 Japanese and other flagged vessels with Japanese interests pass through the 900-kilometer-long Gulf of Aden every year, it looks impossible to protect them all with only two MSDF destroyers. It is like asking two outfielders to cover the entire Tokyo Dome baseball stadium.

The International Maritime Bureau reported that in 2008 a total of 111 commercial vessels, including those with Japanese interest, were attacked by pirates in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters, resulting in 815 people being taken hostage. This year as of June 9, the number of vessels attacked had already reached 133, of which 29 were hijacked despite the presence of around 40 escort ships provided by 25 countries operating in the area.

What should we do when crew members are taken hostage? One way is through negotiations with the pirates, which usually involves paying a ransom. Another way is to rescue them by force.

Somali pirates usually release hostages unharmed when a ransom is paid. However, such payments are bound to encourage the pirates to attack again and again.

An Islamic insurgent group called Al-Shabaab is active in Somalia. It is recognized as a terrorist group by the U.S. government. The Japanese government has a legal right to halt the payment of a ransom if it believes the money will end up in the hands of terrorists. It concerns me that the report I obtained from a British source says that Al-Shabaab receives a certain share of each ransom as a fee for providing training to pirates.

What about use of force? In April, a U.S. Navy special unit shot and killed three of four pirates to rescue the captain of a U.S.-flagged container ship. In the same month, the French Navy used force to rescue four hostages from a hijacked yacht. One hostage and two pirates were killed. With public support, both the U.S. and the French governments are likely to continue making an armed response when they consider such action appropriate. Then, what shall we do? Are we Japanese ready to undertake such a brave and high-risk operation?

It would be the job of ship owners to negotiate with pirates on the payment of a ransom. This is because of the Japanese government's "no-concession policy," under which it never pays a ransom to criminals or terrorists. For successful negotiations, we need a stick as well as a carrot, without which we can only beg. It is, therefore, essential for us to have our own military presence to support a non-military settlement of any crises that flare.

On the other hand, if a ship owner shows reluctance to pay a ransom, the hostages' family members would not hesitate to make a protest to the company. If the hostages are foreign nationals, the situation can easily develop into an international problem.

It is not easy to form a policy and the procedures to respond to a hostage situation, adjusting many different views and conflicting interests. However, we have no other choice. Action without clear policy and procedures will end up in disaster. We must start discussions now among interested parties and government departments concerned to seek a national consensus.

Establishing a methodology for "saving the lives of hostages" is the very least the government owes its people working at sea.

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The author is a crisis management consultant. (IHT/Asahi: July 1,2009)