EDITORIAL: Report on secret pacts

In a democracy, no government has the right to maintain a decades-long deception on diplomatic and national security policies that form the backbone of a nation. But this is precisely what happened in Japan. Fortunately, however, our country has finally achieved a closure of sorts for its sorry history.

An expert panel that was appointed by Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada presented its report Tuesday on four secret agreements between Japan and the United States concerning the 1960 revision of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty.

The secret pacts examined by the panel had been "open secrets" for years due to information disclosed by the United States and statements given by some of the individuals involved. Yet, successive administrations led by the Liberal Democratic Party persistently denied the existence of such agreements and repeatedly gave false explanations before the Diet on the issues.

Last year's historic change of government made it possible to expose this grand "fiction" and bring down the curtain on a "tragicomedy" that was intended to fool the public.

History must be allowed to judge important political decisions that directly affect people's lives and the national interest. This usually requires the passing of time or when a new reality is in place.

This is one of the basic rules of democracy. The panel's report deserves due recognition. We hope the report will serve to strengthen the public's faith in diplomacy and help this country's democracy further mature.

Further examination needed

The panel came up with varied assessments of the four secret deals.

Regarding a closed-door deal concerning the introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Japan, the panel assessed this as "a secret pact in the broad sense of the term." The deal in question was reached when the bilateral security treaty was revised in 1960. The panel's reasoning is that in cases of nuclear-armed U.S. warships making port calls in Japan or passing through Japanese waters, a "tacit agreement" existed under which Washington was not obliged to consult Tokyo prior to the entry of such vessels.

Before the expert panel was appointed, the Foreign Ministry conducted an in-house investigation and concluded there was a disparity between Tokyo and Washington over the interpretation of the agreement. However, even though past prime ministers were briefed on this matter by Foreign Ministry officials, none ever questioned Washington's interpretation. The panel was not mistaken in labeling it a secret pact.

As for a deal to allow the re-introduction of U.S. nuclear weapons into Okinawa during military emergencies after the 1972 reversion of sovereignty to Japan, the panel confirmed the existence of the corroborating document signed by both Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Richard Nixon. But the panel determined this was "not necessarily a secret pact." We do not understand how the panel reached this conclusion.

The six-member panel had slightly more than three months to compile its report. In our view, its interviews with those involved on the U.S. side were neither thorough nor sufficient.

Now that the panel has issued its report, the government has declassified and disclosed the huge amount of diplomatic documents examined by the panel members. The government investigation is now at an end. The next step is for scholars and others to verify the investigation results from all manner of perspectives with U.S. documents to guide them.

Decades of LDP rule to blame

The Diet needs to play a crucial role in this matter. The Lower House Committee on Foreign Affairs is set to summon unsworn witnesses in an effort to examine the secret agreements in more detail. It is definitely the Diet's responsibility to keep digging.

The secret deals are negative legacy of decades of LDP rule. The party, now an opposition force, must face its responsibility squarely.

But the secret agreements also point to a deep dilemma that plagued the government of the time.

It may be summed up as follows: Given the Japanese people's strong anti-nuclear sentiment, it was politically impossible for Tokyo to openly allow nuclear-armed U.S. warships to make port calls in Japan. Washington stuck to its policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons. If Japan kept its ports closed to all nuclear-capable U.S. vessels, it would have stymied U.S. military operations and strategies. That would have diminished the power of nuclear deterrence.

But if the government had truly believed that nuclear-armed U.S. vessels must be allowed to make port calls for the sake of Japan's own security, surely the government could have made sure it left no stone unturned in trying to win the understanding of the people, no matter how difficult that might have been.

It is now beyond doubt that nuclear-armed vessels did drop anchor at Yokosuka, Sasebo and other ports. This was in blatant conflict with the nation's three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, manufacturing or bringing nuclear weapons into Japan.

Defenders of the secret Japan-U.S. pacts argue that the government ultimately protected Japan's security by turning a blind eye to what the United States was doing.

After the end of the Cold War, the United States in the early 1990s removed all its tactical nuclear weapons from its surface warships. There was no excuse for the Japanese government to continue lying to the people for nearly 20 years when it no longer needed to lie because the possibility of U.S. warships bringing nuclear weapons into Japanese waters has not existed.

Non-nuclear principles must stay

Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama has vowed to keep the three non-nuclear principles intact.

Some people argue that the nation should switch to a "2.5 principle," which will allow nuclear-armed vessels to drop anchor at Japanese ports in the event of a security crisis.

But in reality, the United States bringing nuclear weapons into Japan is simply inconceivable. It makes absolutely no sense to review the three non-nuclear principles on the assumption of a worst-case scenario.

In response to U.S. President Barack Obama's call for a "world without nuclear weapons," the international community is stepping up efforts for nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation. The best course of action for Japan is to stand firm on its three non-nuclear principles and assert its leadership in the creation of a security system that relies as little as possible on nuclear weapons and strive to be an architect of peace in Northeast Asia.

And we need to radically review our system of disclosure of diplomatic documents. In Japan, documents are supposed to be disclosed after 30 years as a general rule. But there are too many exceptions. We demand readier disclosure that is in line with the basic spirit of the rule. We would also like to point out the importance of keeping well-preserved records of the policymaking processes.

The expert panel expressed its regret that certain documents, which ought to exist, could not be found. Senior Foreign Ministry officials have said that some documents pertaining to the secret Japan-U.S. agreements were destroyed before the information disclosure law took effect in April 2001. If this is true, it was an unforgivable act of gross tampering with history.

At the end of the day, no secret diplomatic agreement should exist in a democratic nation. If anything has to be kept secret from the people for some extreme reason, the parties responsible must be fully prepared to face severe recrimination from future generations. Every politician and diplomat must always bear in mind that it is they who must face history with respect and humility.

--The Asahi Shimbun, March 10