Marines symbolize U.S. 'resolve'

WASHINGTON--The former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Richard B. Myers, views the presence of U.S. Marines in Okinawa Prefecture as demonstrating U.S. "resolve" to protect Japan.

The retired general stressed during a recent interview that the Marines must remain stationed in Okinawa as a deterrence against an attack.

Myers, who as commander of U.S. Forces Japan worked to mend Japan-U.S. relations after the rape of a schoolgirl by U.S. servicemen in Okinawa in 1995 triggered widespread protests, also called on the two sides to discuss security ties more deeply and in a calm manner.

Excerpts from the interview follow:

Question: Do U.S. Marines have to be permanently stationed in Japan? If so, why?

Answer: The first obvious point is that they are the only U.S. ground forces in Japan. They're mobile. They'd probably be some of the first ground forces to arrive, in any kind of conflict inside Japan.

The other thing I would say is that the advantage of having a ground force to work with the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force is invaluable. You can't ask people to come in from the U.S. in times of a crisis and then shake hands with senior Japanese military personnel and have any relationship built on trust and credibility.

You have to look at (deterrence) through the potential adversaries' lens. It goes back to (a question of whether) this is a credible deterrence, "How seriously does the U.S. take this (U.S.-Japan Security) Treaty to defend Japan?" We've got a sizable number of forces stationed there, around 42,000 or 44,000, if you add the U.S. Seventh Fleet and all (Air Force and the Marines).

Would that body be enough to protect Japan from an assault from North Korea? Maybe not. But an adversary would have to know, with those kinds of forces there, with the kind of exposure those forces have to potential adversaries and all those sorts of threats from North Korea and so forth, that that's a heck of a resolve.

The perception is that the U.S. has put its ground forces in a place where they're going to be first to fight and first to risk their lives in case of a defense scenario.

Q: In what kind of scenario could the Marines in Okinawa operate effectively?

A: One of the things we're notoriously bad at is predicting where is the next adversary coming from. In early 2001, as the Bush administration came in and as people were being confirmed in front of our Senate, nobody said, "Hey, the next big threat is going to come from violent extremism."

For almost the next 10 years, that's where we've been focused. So, who knows what the next issue is going to be.

I think it's difficult, today, to construct a scenario where there's some land invasion of Japan. Is it possible? Probably. Is it probable? Very low, I think, probability. But that would be a scenario where the Marines would be ideally suited for that.

Q: Do the Marines have to be stationed in Okinawa?

A: I was in government--as commander, U.S. Forces Japan--when we went through the SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) process, back in 1996 to find ways to lessen the burden on the Okinawan people from the U.S. force presence.

We talked about moving the Marines to other parts of Japan, where there might be more room and less impact on the Japanese citizens. Well, that's a lot of force to put anywhere. You wouldn't have the room on Guam. Guam's infrastructure is not that good. So I don't think there's any place in the Asia-Pacific region that would easily accommodate that kind of capability.

Q: Are you worried about the U.S.-Japan relationship?

A: In the big strategic sense, I'm not too worried because this relationship has now gone on for many decades. It is, after all, founded on a set of shared values and a strategic interest of both countries that will keep the dialogue moving, hopefully improving, as we go in the future.

(Futenma's relocation) is an important issue for the U.S. and for Japan. But there are other strategic issues that we need to get to as well. North Korea, where is China going, and just overall security in the region, which has been, I think, good for both the U.S. economy and the Japanese economy, not to mention the Republic of Korea and China.

Any distraction in the intellectual energy . . . and the focus on Futenma distracts from those other strategic interests. It's really been unfortunate that that's been the focus of this relationship. I would hope that we can get by that fairly quickly and move on.