POINT OF VIEW/ Zia Mian and M. V. Ramana: India nuke rule upsets security in South Asia

The Japanese government is under pressure to change its rules on nuclear technology exports and lift the ban on sales to India, even though it has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

This rule change is aimed at bringing Japan in line with a 2008 decision by Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) countries to permit nuclear commerce with India. The NSG decision has served to drive the nuclear arms race between India and Pakistan.

To prevent the problem from getting worse, Japan and other like-minded countries should reaffirm their traditionally strong positions on nuclear nonproliferation and the need to control nuclear trade, and not join the rush to sell nuclear technology to India.

In 2005, U.S. President George W. Bush changed 30-year-old laws banning nuclear trade with India. By doing this, he hoped to recruit India as a strategic partner to counter the rise of China and to gain privileged access to a big emerging new market. This effort was strongly backed by France, Russia and Britain, who all hoped to sell billions of dollars worth of reactors to India.

To go forward, this decision had to be approved by the 46 countries of the NSG, including Japan, who had all agreed not to sell nuclear technology to any country that has not signed the NPT and that does not have international safeguards on all its nuclear facilities to ensure material is not diverted to make nuclear weapons.

Only three countries currently meet these conditions--India, Pakistan and Israel. The United States was able to overcome opposition from other governments and push through the change in rules, creating a special exclusion for India.

India is now free to import uranium for its civil nuclear program and to buy nuclear reactors. This will ease constraints on uranium availability in India, enabling it to use more domestic uranium for its nuclear weapons program.

Uranium has been in short supply in India, partly because local communities have resisted efforts to open new mines in various parts of the country. The shortage has resulted in many power reactors being operated at low load factors. The idea of fueling power reactors with imported uranium and conserving domestic uranium resources for weapon purposes has been suggested by several policy-makers, including most prominently a former head of the National Security Advisory Board.

India is believed to have produced about 550 to 700 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium, sufficient for about 110 to 140 nuclear weapons of the kind used on Nagasaki in 1945. This plutonium is produced in India's CIRUS and Dhruva research reactors, although CIRUS was supplied by Canada for peaceful purposes. The use of CIRUS to make plutonium for India's 1974 nuclear test led to the creation of the NSG to ensure that nuclear technology transferred for peaceful purposes could not be misused again.

India also makes highly enriched uranium, the other material that can be used for nuclear weapons. But India is believed to enrich uranium primarily to fuel its nuclear submarines that will carry ballistic missiles. There are ambitious plans for a fleet of up to six nuclear submarines to be deployed over the next few decades. The first nuclear submarine is currently undergoing tests.

Pakistan and Israel, the other two countries that have not signed the NPT, are still subject to the NSG ban on nuclear trade. They have sought exemptions similar to the one granted to India. Pakistan, which has a history of war and conflict with India and a powerful army that dominates decision-making, has been particularly concerned.

Pakistan's National Command Authority, which manages the nuclear weapons program, has vowed not to fall behind in the South Asian nuclear arms race. Pakistan, which is believed to be able to make about as many nuclear weapons as India, is pushing to increase its capacity to produce enriched uranium and plutonium. It has also blocked the start of negotiations on a global treaty to ban the production of nuclear material for weapons purposes.

In addition, Pakistan has asked its ally China to sell it two nuclear power reactors, even though this would violate current NSG rules.

Along with making more nuclear weapons, both India and Pakistan are committed to an ambitious expansion of nuclear power. In both countries, however, despite decades of efforts and large expenses, nuclear electricity accounts for only a few percent of total electricity production. Moreover, nuclear power is a very expensive source of electricity generation and is an inefficient way to deliver energy to the large and poor rural populations in the two countries.

In India, there is public opposition against plans to expand nuclear power. Local protests have occurred at all sites identified for new nuclear reactor projects. In May this year, at a public meeting to consider the environmental impact assessment of proposed reactors at Jaitapur, in the western state of Maharashtra, opinion was unanimous that the reactors should not be built.

At Mithi Virdi, a proposed site in the state of Gujarat, inhabitants of nearby villages refused to allow government officials to test the soil as part of an environment assessment.

Increasing nuclear trade with India will fuel the ongoing arms race in South Asia. It will bail out a failing Indian nuclear energy program that has had little regard for either the economic or the environmental and health consequences of its activities. It offers little real benefit to India's poor.

Japan's government should not put possible profits for its handful of nuclear companies over the larger principle of preventing proliferation. Rather, it should emphasize collaboration with India on developing renewable energy technology for people both in cities and in the countryside, improving energy efficiency in industry, offices and homes, and in providing better public transportation to reduce the demand for cars. These would not increase the nuclear danger and do more to mitigate climate change.

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Zia Mian and M. V. Ramana are researchers at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University.