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EU plays supporting role in Korea, others lead

 The European Union's evolving Common and Foreign Security Policy (CFSP)received considerable world attention when the EU presidency-consisting of Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson, accompanied by the EU's foreign policy and security chief Javier Solana and Commissioner for External Affairs Chris Patten―visited North Korea from May 2 to3, followed immediately afterward by a visit to South Korea. It was the highest level meeting yet between Pyongyang and the West and it was also very unusual for the presidency to be represented by the prime minister rather than the foreign minister. The three leaders had three meetings with Kim Jong Il and the North admitted a record contingent of over 80 foreign journalists.

 In the media coverage of this event, it was asserted that this was a spontaneous event, and there were also critical opinions that the EU was somehow going beyond its station and interfering in a policy area where it was an outsider. Looking carefully at the events preceding and following the presidency's visit to Pyongyang, it becomes clear, however,that it has been the culmination of a string of EU actions which are now being followed up.

 First of all, it is important to take notice of the growing institutionalization and expansion of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy, which is acquiring gradually greater scope and tools. The appointment of Javier Solana, the former secretary-general of NATO,as the EU's first foreign policy and security chief, or high representative, is one indication of this development.

 Within this growing institutional framework, the Korean Peninsula has become since the end of the1980s an area of particular interest for the EU because the EU has no direct interests that would make finding a consensus among the 15 member states too difficult or prevent the EU from being accepted by both Korean states.

 The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) came into the focus of the EU within the frame work set out in the EU's1994 Asia paper, "Toward a New Asia Strategy," as well as a function of its relationships with Japan and the United States. According to this paper, the EU needs not only to strengthen its economic presence in Asia to maintain its leading role in the world economy, but also to pay closer attention to the maintenance of peace and stability, which is essential for the EU's economic interests in that region.

 The Korean Peninsula was finally put on the agenda of the EU by pressures from various partners. The United States has been urging the EU to shoulder more international burden, notably in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, which is also part of the official EU-U.S.Atlantic Agenda. Japan has prompted the EU to be more active in areas of concern to Tokyo, in exchange for Japanese support of European concerns, such as in the Balkans. Japan refers to this mutual support as"cross support." All this came to head in the running up to the first ASEAN-EU summit meeting (ASEM) in Bangkok in 1996, when the EU had to offer something tangible to its Asian partners, including Japan. The EU decided to do so by contributing to the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization(KEDO). Both the United States and Japan had been pressing the EU for such a contribution.

 The result of these circumstances and pressures on the EU was its provision of funding for KEDO, followed by its membership on the latter organization's board, in September 1997.The total contribution of the EU to KEDO from March1995 through July 1999 has been $52 million (6.5 billion yen), compared with Japan's$35.7 million―which includes a refundable collateral of $19 million―South Korea's $62.2 million and the United States' $152.5 million.In 1995 the EU also started its very substantial humanitarian aid program of food, agricultural rehabili tation and medical aid to North Korea. Without joining together, no individual EU member state, even not the biggest, would have been able or willing to offer such an amount to KEDO,and it would therefore have been impossible to be admitted to join the originalKEDO Executive Board members. These consisted of the Republic of Korea(South Korea), the United States and Japan. Although the proliferation of nuclear weapon materials and missiles by North Korea directly threatens EU interests in the Middle East, since North Korea is said to have sold such items to Iran, Syria,Iraq and Libya, the awareness of this danger is not so high in the EU.

 The advent of the Kim Dae Jung presidency in South Korea in 1998considerably widened the room of EU diplomacy toward North Korea, with Kim Dae Jung actively seeking the support of the EU for his sunshine policy. His speech in Berlin in March 2000became a decisive step toward his June 2000 summit meeting with Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang. For South Korea, EU involvement on the Korean Peninsula has considerable political significance because it raises international awareness of the tensions in the region and helps to internationalize the issue. This will become crucial not only in the event of conflict breaking out again,but also in the event of reunification, when South Korea will need all the help it can get. In the meantime,involvement by other countries encourages North Korea to become more open to the outside. When Kim Dae Jung received his Nobel Peace Prize in December2000 in Stockholm, he visited Swedish Prime Minister Goran Persson and made a direct plea to him for greater EU support. This plea became an important motivation for Sweden, which took over the EU Presidency (January-June 2001) to organize the presidency visit in May this year. At the same time, the EU Commission had started from December1998 a high-level political dialogue with North Korea.The second dialogue took place again in Brussels in November 1999, and the third one in Pyongyang in December 2000. From this chain of events it becomes obvious that the May 2001meeting in Pyongyang was an event long in the making and prompted by all major actors involved on the Korean Peninsula.

 North Korea's interests in the EU is obvious: Humanitarian aid, support for KEDO and diplomatic recognition.As a result of the May 2001meeting in Pyongyang, the EU established diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and the details are currently being negotiated. Since January1999, all member states except France have established diplomatic relations with North Korea. France is still holding back, to extract a greater North Korean commitment on human rights.Some European countries have managed to extract other unprecedented concessions from the North,such as posting of one ambassador simultaneously to Seoul and Pyongyang(Netherlands) or free movement for diplomats in North Korea (Germany).

 The EU's policy toward North Korea continues to be expanded and followed up.There are now more contacts to extend further humanitarian aid and monitoring of aid is improving. A considerable number of European NGOs are involved. The EU sent in February this year a technical assistance mission to North Korea to prepare market economy training and give technical assistance to develop, for example, energy efficiency. The EU also provided easier access this year to North Korean textile exports to the EU by increasing its textile quota by 60percent. Moreover, the EU is in the final stages of concluding another five-year contribution schedule for KEDO.

 The EU has made it clear that assistance and market access are linked to North Korea's response to international concerns in regard to progress on inter-Korean reconciliation, nonproliferation issues, respect for human rights and economic structural reform. There have been voices in the United States that the EU is soft on North Korea and provides aid and diplomatic support without expecting any reciprocity. However,while the new U.S. administration is still struggling to resume negotiations with North Korea, the presidency was told by Kim Jong Il that North Korea would stick to the moratorium on missile tests until at least 2003 and that he would reciprocate Kim Dae Jung's historical visit to Pyongyang. Moreover,over, in June the EU started in Brussels with North Korea discussions on human rights, which are a central concern for the EU, itsmember states and the European Parliament.

 However, it is squarely recognized in the EU that its role on the Korean Peninsula will stay very limited, but that it can reinforce and help sustain positive tendencies if the big players are willing to make progress.

The author is a professor at Newcastle University in England and specializes in Japanese foreign and security policies.

2001/7/20
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