The terrorist attacks on the United States on Sept. 11 and the U.S.-led response are defining policies all across Asia today. The strikes on targets in Afghanistan have united most Americans domestically. A global coalition of very different states has also been rafted together to fight terrorism.

Still, these events threaten to divide some Asians from the United States, notwithstanding the widespread outrage against the terrorist attacks. The Bush administration has drawn a line between those countries that are with them and those who are not, and is rapidly changing its relationships with many states in the process.

Over time, divisions may possibly grow amongst Asians themselves. Japan and other Asians who are close to the United States may be in danger of having to choose between being with America and being with their fellow Asians. There are three main reasons for this.

First, Asians differ in their relation to U.S. power. Japan, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), Thailand and the Philippines are American allies and some, like Singapore, enjoy close relations and view the United States as a relatively benign superpower. On the other hand, states like Vietnam and China have had different experiences and are wary of U.S. hegemony. Even within states that are U.S. allies, segments of society vocally oppose the United States. In the Philippines after Ferdinand Marcos, for example, the Left played a leading role in closing U.S. bases at Clarke and Subic. Similarly in Japan today, some oppose U.S. bases in Okinawa.

Secondly, several Southeast Asian states are Islamic, like Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia, which has the world's largest Muslim population. Others, like Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines, also have significant Muslim minorities. It is therefore essential that the U.S.-led response be understood as being targeted against terrorists, and not perceived as a war against Islam. This is especially in Indonesia and Malaysia, which are influential among Muslim and developing countries.

Despite considerable efforts to this end, protests are recurring in Indonesia. In Malaysia too, concerns have been publicly raised. If U.S.-led strikes continue much longer and civilian casualties mount in Afghanistan, so will questions and resistance. Sensitivities may be particularly strong during the upcoming Ramadan month, when Muslims fast and focus on their faith.

This can potentially destabilize societies and possibly affect the strength of incumbent leaders. In Indonesia, growing anti-U.S. protests have ended the early hope that the new president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, could stabilize the country and bring back growth. As she marks 100 days in office, the economy seems instead to be in a downward spiral. Politically, the president needs to be careful not to give a Muslim axis of politicians a chance to snipe at her, and this caution may limit her government's ability to openly support U.S. actions.

To a lesser extent, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed must also tread carefully to isolate the Islamist opposition without antagonizing the United States, and affecting major trade and investment ties.

In the Philippines, while the Gloria Macapagal Arroyo government stands with the United States, problems may increase in the Muslim South. In particular, the Abu Sayaf splinter group, which has kidnapped U.S. and other citizens, may feel cornered and increasingly turn to violence and crime.

There is, as such, a dangerous asymmetry in the response to the U.S. strikes. While popular in the United States, they put pressure on governments in other countries where there are strong sentiments for the suffering of fellow Muslims.

Asians may also be divided because of their own underlying rivalries. U.S. efforts to build a broad coalition have brought about a marked improvement in previously uneasy relations with several countries, including China. An improved U.S.-China relationship can potentially unsettle others in the region.

Japan, traditionally America's closest ally in Asia, has been anxious to demonstrate its support for the U.S.-led actions. The stated reason is to avoid repeating the mistake of the Gulf War, when considerable monetary assistance was given without much appreciation. An additional reason may well be the wish not to be on the sidelines, while China is active and U.S.-China relations strengthen.

Yet Japan's actions to give assistance have only increased tensions with neighbors. Considerable numbers in Asia and in Japan itself still remain uncomfortable with any sign that Japan is resuming a military role, no matter how worthy the cause.

Nevertheless, all should take comfort that Japanese involvement in military frontline operations has been ruled out. More Asians should respect the pressures that Japan feels to be of assistance to the U.S.-led efforts. Some will accept a Japanese role in assisting in logistics and rear-area operations. To do less may be unrealistic, given the U.S.-Japan alliance. Still, Japan's actions will be closely watched. The fact that Japan already has one of the largest military budgets in the world should not be ignored. Yet while the provision of military and support assistance has been controversial, much more attention must be given to the possibility that Japan can lead in another area of response to the attacks on the United States. This is in the field of economics.

The United States and world economies, after all, have been another victim as the Sept. 11 attacks and their aftermath accelerated the fall in market confidence. Asian economies have been particularly vulnerable. Many had not recovered from the regional crisis that began in 1997 or pressed ahead with reforms. Most prospered by increasing their exports to the U.S. market, and as the U.S. market fell away, so did their growth rates.

These difficult external economic conditions can combine with internal division in countries like Indonesia to create the danger of a sharp downward spiral. Japan cannot, of course, cure the world's economic woes on its own. As the second-largest national economy in the world, it can, however, play a significant role in promoting stability and growth. This is especially for its Asian neighbors.

Much of this, however, is dependent on Japan's own reforms. A more open and optimistic Japanese market, for example, could help exports. A healthier banking sector would also be essential to restart foreign investment. Another prospect is for closer cooperation between Japan and China, the only economy that seems so far to have escaped the worst effects of the downturn. While difficult, closer China-Japan cooperation for economic development in Asia offers an opportunity to rebalance the triangle of relations that these two Asian giants have with the United States. This is especially where the two can combine and work with other states, such as those in ASEAN.

The recent Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in China offered an opportunity for this, as China hoped to prioritize economic issues in contrast to the U.S. emphasis on anti-terrorist efforts. Another opportunity for this agenda for regional economic growth and stability came with the ASEAN Plus Three summit, when the leaders of ASEAN met their counterparts from China, Japan and South Korea.

In military-related activities, Japan can, at present, only play a supporting role, and will face continuing controversy. In the economic field, it can, however, lay a claim to a shared leadership, especially in Asia. This is no less important. For military action can only do so much to address terrorism. There is also a need to address the instability and lack of hope that create the conditions for extremism and violence. Economic development and peace building can offer those longer-term solutions and should not be neglected as Asia grapples with the aftershock of events. If not, our present efforts will sow seeds for future danger.

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The author is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs.