Many factors are yet again coming together which require urgent action to prevent the North Korean issue from destabilizing Northeast Asia. Japan is singularly ill prepared to act because of specific grievances and because of its lingering political-economic crisis.

The World Food Program (WFP) has warned of an impending famine crisis in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) because certain food items are no longer in the grant pipeline or have already run out of supply. Committed donations of cereals are to run out in summer. The reason is donor fatigue with the major donors like the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea (South Korea).

Japan's failure to make any commitments this year was singled out for the problem because it was the biggest food donor last year but failed so far to make any new contributions.

The reasons for this situation are clear: The Japanese government is now more than ever put on the spot to show some progress on the issue of the missing Japanese who were allegedly abducted by North Korea after the new damning revelations in a court case against former members of the Red Army who sought refuge in North Korea. And LDP politicians who were more conciliatory in their approach to Pyongyang, like Koichi Kato or Masaaki Nakayama, have lost influence.

Nothing can be expected to happen so far even after the resumption of Red Cross talks. On the other hand, no one can expect the Pyongyang regime to admit that it abducted foreign nationals.

A face-saving compromise will have to be found. Since the Red Army refuge in North Korea is used as a reason by the United States to keep the country on the list of state terrorism, contributing to the blockage of U.S.-North Korea relations, the Pyongyang government may decide to expel the remaining Red Army exiles and blame them for the abductions. Another issue burdening Japan-North Korea relations is Japan's planned lifting of the suspected North Korean boat which was sunk in China's exclusive economic zone.

North Korea's pressure on Beijing to prevent the lifting may now find more willing ears with the Chinese military, which is particularly irked by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's Yasukuni visit, as the cancellation of the first Chinese warship visit to Japan has illustrated.

More fundamentally, however, there is no major policy constituency in Japan pressing for the improvement of relations with North Korea, notably in view of the circumstance that normalization of relations would mean considerable financial contributions at a time of severe economic problems at home.

Incentives for Japan to react more constructively can only come from outside, especially from South Korea and the United States. At the most basic level, these two countries will want to prevent another famine in North Korea for humanitarian reasons, but also to prevent North Korea from becoming an uncontrollable agenda item.

China is coming under pressure by dramatic escapes of North Koreans through Beijing-based Western embassies. At the same time, North Korea is no longer seen as such a stark security threat.

Ambassador Stephen Bosworth, former head of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), pointed out at a recent Korea conference at Cambridge University, ``The perception of a reduction of the North Korean threat has already begun to effect policies and shape options for the future.''

Another speaker, the former Canadian ambassador to Pyongyang, Howard Balloch, pointed out that foreign aid has opened North Korea and ``de-demonized'' the country for many foreigners. He was arguing for a much bigger and sustained engagement effort of North Korea, but that seems to be unlikely in view of the Bush administration's attitude.

However, the recent trip by Kim Dae Jung's special envoy to Pyongyang has been instrumental in making the administration more willing to resume talks with the North.

One can also expect that the administration will have to consider very carefully the impact of any confrontational North Korea policy on the surprise presidential candidate of Kim Dae Jung's party, who, as a human rights lawyer, is arguing in favor of a more independent South Korean policy toward Pyongyang.

All this points to some greater engagement of North Korea which will put pressure on Japan to engage Pyongyang as well. Neither side can afford to leave the bilateral relationship to the Red Army. (IHT/Asahi: May 10,2002)

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The author, a professor at the University of Newcastle in England, is currently a visiting professor at Beijing University.