As a civilization that has existed for well over 5,000 years, China has shown tremendous staying power. Yet as a modernizing country, China is highly vulnerable to the pressures of the process.

While China is not likely to disintegrate, a prediction made by Gordon Chang in his book "The Coming Collapse of China," it is nevertheless a country that is easy to admire -- for its grandiose history and rich culture -- yet inevitably hard to rule.

Indeed, what makes the pressures of reform and modernization more acute, as compared with other developing countries, are China's sheer numbers. Simple problems can easily acquire a massive dimension and scale, often tying decision-makers in knots.

Take urbanization, for instance. When economic reforms began in 1978, 82 percent of China's population was classified as "rural". Today, this number is down to 70 percent. But due to increased urbanization, as occasioned by continued economic growth, one in six persons (i.e., 200 million people) in China is now living and working in a city of more than 1 million. Nor does the trend of urbanization appear to be easing. Currently, there are 688 cities of various sizes in China, of which 200 cities have a population of more than 2 million. Another 600 cities are to be built in 2011.

As more cities are added to the urbanizing landscape of China, however, the federal and provincial governments have to contend with two constituencies: the economically powerful ones who demand better and wider range of services as well as greater representation. The authorities also have to address the problems caused by some 120 million low-skilled migrant workers -- often referred to as the "floating population" -- who often travel from city to city looking for a job, but often getting none.

Beijing is already sensitive to the demands of the former. In President Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" theory, for instance, he urged in March 1999 that the interest of the merchants and professionals be better accommodated lest they exist at the outer fringe of the Chinese Communist Party to undermine it from without.

As for the unskilled workers, however, the federal and provincial authorities are at a loss to come up with any firm solutions. Indeed, with employment being so scarce, these migrant workers put immense stress on the rickety welfare system of the cities. It has been conservatively estimated that the authorities need to create some 20 million jobs each year to absorb rural and urban labor alone. That is an average of almost 1.6 million jobs a month -- a tall order by any standards.

It is little wonder that Beijing has increasingly left the issue of job creation to market forces. The problem of job creation, in other words, is too difficult to resolve through any one set of governmental institutions. Invariably, it is also important to remember that people in China experience different lifestyles not just according to their skill sets and education background, but also according to the region where they grew up -- that is, whether they were living in rural or urban cities -- or indeed whether they are male or female.

Thus, other than one's genetic endowment, geography and gender continue to have their influence on the prospect of a person's ultimate station in life. In an economically disadvantaged region such as Guanxi, Gansu, Yunnan or Guizhou, life is likely to be hard and bereft of the normal material trappings. The physical infrastructure for better education and training is simply not there for them to enhance their prospects.

Take the plight of the women, for instance. Since 1998, more than half of 60 million newly laid-off workers in some 115,000 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have been women -- this despite the fact that they made up only one-third of the workforce. Because of an ingrained Chinese culture of preferring men over women, the latter's collective interest have sadly been systematically neglected. Thus, while China has laws that encourage the empowerment of women, their priorities are often given the short shrift. In the private sector, some 46 percent of the workers are female. They too are faced with various challenges. Because of the presence of illegal and cheap labor from the poor regions, their wages remain depressed or stagnant.

The same applies to workers from minority groups. There are 55 minorities in China. All of them are concentrated in economically poor regions and provinces. While Beijing has made concerted attempts to better their economic and social lot, such as through the "Go West" campaign to develop Xinjiang and Tibet, these measures assume at the outset that they are willing to forego their way of life, such as by leaving their traditional stock of trade in craftsmanship, which they aren't.

Another "fundamental disconnect" that China confronts is that of interprovincial economic disparity. Whereas coastal cities' economic profiles are capital-intensive and highly mechanized, those in the hinterland are not. The rate with which income is accumulated in the former is therefore faster.

Therefore, the issue of how best to distribute the benefits, that is across different regions, has piqued the mind of the leaders: Does Beijing need to delegate more power to the provinces? How should neighboring provinces relate to one another? These are questions of governance to which Beijing has not found any solution, allowing the provinces, in the interim, to attract foreign direct investments separately.

What Beijing has done is to enjoin different provinces to reinforce their links, so as to facilitate the better flow of trade. That said, contrary to what many may believe, Beijing is not lacking in boldness, even in areas verging on that sensitive issue, political reforms.

Since 1988, there have been three rounds of elections involving a million villages. Twenty-one provinces participated in these elections. The committees have four to seven members of which one must be a woman. In large villages, assemblies have one representative for about every 10 households.

That the central leadership is willing to give local elections a try implies, in principle, a desire to search for creative solutions. The elections have become more competitive, and the use of secret ballot is not at all uncommon. These efforts are aided by the Carter Center of the United States.

While the "village democracy", limited as it is, cannot foretell the future political trend of China, its very exercise within a unitary-party state suggests a Chinese leadership that is not as dogmatic as some outsiders might believe. At the very least, China accepts the instrumentality and usefulness of democracy in some forms, rather than to eliminate it entirely. Indeed, these elections are meant to ensure democratic management, policy-making (at the village level) and democratic supervision.

For what it is worth, China has to be mindful of international standards when dealing with social and cultural challenges. Problems arising out of Tibet, for instance, cannot be dealt with in a draconian manner. To do so would be to invite shrill accusations of human-rights abuses. Under globalization, reputation matters.

Measures aimed at repressing any one group or minority will be seen in a negative light. They can affect the decision of foreign investors to invest their funds into China, especially given the increasingly activist non-governmental organizations and shareholders. In confronting these diverse challenges, China has to be creative and firm. But it has to pay heed to the views of the international community too.

Naturally, given the difficulty of each the challenges listed above, it serves the world well to be more sympathetic to China's attempt to modernize itself.