If globalization is real, then the crisis in the Middle East should theoretically have an impact on the rest of the world; especially Asia, where at least eight of its economies are exposed to the vagaries of market forces.

Yet, other than the fear of a spike in the price of oil----now hovering at US$ 76 a barrel----the policy makers in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Korea have had a relatively dull day.

There is no imminent talk of lowering the interest rate (to make money less costly), for that matter, to prime the economy with a fiscal plan. In other words, market-wise the Middle East does not matter all that much.

More over, the Israeli incursions into Lebanon and Palestinian territories may not last or culminate in a larger campaign. Despite a reputation to the contrary, Israel is not averse to exchanging hostages for the release of its prisoners.

Indeed, even as the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert vowed revenge on the captors, and officially denied any prisoner swap, it is widely believed that negotiations are already underway with Egypt as mediator.

Come what may, the fact that the Middle East has not had an immediate impact on East Asia, other than on those occasions when the countries impose an oil embargo, can only suggest that the links between the two region, either in terms of trade or diplomacy, remain very thin at best.

In the words of Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, the situation in the Middle East does not make East Asia 'sensitive' to its dynamics, nor 'vulnerable' to its political morass.

It would, however, be wrong to see such a 'clean break' between East Asia and the Middle East completely. While the impact may not be obvious, the ripple effects from the Middle East are undeniable.

Over the last 40 years, events in that region have percolated to such an extent where they eventually influenced the mindset and value of the people in East Asia; especially the Muslims.

Without directly identifying the Muslims, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has spoken of the triple evils of "splittism", "secessionism" and "separatism".
To be sure, these three terms were conceived to describe the radical Islamic movements in China and Russia.

In Southeast Asia, there are two Muslim majority countries, and two other Muslim minority countries too. Malaysia and Indonesia fall into the former, while Thailand and the Philippines fall into the latter.

Of the set of four countries, Thailand and the Philippines, in varying degree, continue to be mired in problems associated with seeming Islamic insurgency in the south.
Indeed, when Israel first defeated the pan Arab forces in the Middle East in 1967, which invariably expanded its territory by more than 30 % in the now infamous Six Day War, the public opinion among the Muslims in East Asia were immediately radicalized.

Malaysia sought to recognize the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), even provided a platform for Yasser Arafat to advocate his cause.

Two years later, when the Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, widely considered the third sacred Muslim site, was torched by an Australian Jew, Muslim government in the region rose up in unison.

The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was formed in 1969, with the former Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdulrahman Al Haj, as its first secretary general. Indonesia also became a member of OIC, despite its secular character.

In turn, when the oil producing Arab states were able to tap into their wealth in the 1970s, they began sponsoring various forms of missionary movement and Wahabbi groups in the region.

These movements have since left a strong legacy on the social fabric of countries like Malaysia and Indonesia where the secular governments have had to struggle with the cultural encroachments of Arabization.

In 1979, when Iranians dethroned the Shah Pahlavi, Muslims in East Asia were also inspired by this very act of rebellion. Anwar Ibrahim was one of the few Muslim leaders from Southeast Asia to have met with Imam Khomeini in Iran. The moniker "Neither east nor west, Islam is the best" became the rallying cry of the Muslim students and leaders in the region. They contributed to the subsequent wave of Islamization in the 1980s in Southeast Asia.

Indeed, if we define Afghanistan to be a part of the Middle Eastern fabric, then the war there in 1979 until 1990, further lionized some Muslims in East Asia into believing that a group of ragtag Mujahideens could topple great powers too.

The result has been the likes of Jemaah Islamiya and Kumpulan Militan Mujahideen, some of whose members were trained in Afghanistan, trying to stake its presence in Indonesian and Malaysian politics by violent means.

In this context, an unstable Middle East is ultimately bad for East Asia, not just in terms of its impact on the price of oil, but the ultimate shape and contour of Islamic ideas coming from the region.

War and militancy among the Muslim and nationalist groups in that part of the world have a tendency of skewing the beliefs of some Muslims in the region too. They infuse jihad, and Islam, with a martial quality, which renders the political discourse defiant and destructive.

Violence and militarism in the Middle East, if allowed to persist, can delude Muslim individuals and organizations into believing that force is ultimately good---or needed---to liberate oneself from the clutches of oppression.