The Japanese Self-Defense Forces' logistical support for the new war against terrorism is in stark contrast to what we saw 10 years ago during the Gulf War. Back then, Maritime Self-Defense Force minesweepers were dispatched to the Persian Gulf only after military action ended. This time, the SDF are sent to the Indian Ocean in the midst of warfare.

But we should exercise Japan's national fundamental moderation of the security measures amid the stark change.

I would like to take this opportunity to criticize the fact that MSDF high officials had secretly met with U.S. military officials to ask them to request Japan's participation, and I demand that the government and Diet exert strict civilian control over the SDF.

An MSDF official began contacting U.S. military staffs of Commander Naval Force Japan (CNFJ) in Yokosuka on Sept. 17, less than a week after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. He and his boss aimed at getting the Japanese government to dispatch a fleet to escort a U.S. carrier in the Indian Ocean.

That day, a powerful Diet member with vested interest in national security received an internal document compiled by the MSDF high officials. The document, ``The Maritime Self-Defense Forces' Measures To the Terrorist Attacks and Support for the U.S. Military,'' covered five clauses pertaining to ``Provision of Security for USFJ bases, Intelligence Support, Various Support for U.S. Fleet en route and on station deployed area'' and other missions.

The second clause outlined a plan to mobilize the MSDF's escort fleet with a U.S. carrier battle group deployed in the Indian Ocean. Under the plan, the two forces would be dispatched together, claiming to conduct joint military training. When and if the forces are attacked by pro-terrorist groups, the SDF can fight back using as excuses article No. 95 of the SDF Law-which allows the SDF to take military action to protect itself-or article No. 90-which allows for defensive action to maintain order. In this document, they insisted that this would enable the SDF to take part in retaliatory battles without infringing on Japan's constitutional ban on collective self-defense.

But I believe the SDF officials' interpretations of Article No. 90 and 95 are far from what the law intended them to be.

On the same day, the MSDF high official visited CNFJ's headquarters in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture. There, he presented a document explaining the five clauses in English and also explained the content verbally.

The MSDF high officials made repeat visits to the headquarters. But according to sources close to U.S. officials, the U.S. Navy was not particularly interested in the MSDF carrier escorts because the new war was against terrorists who lack air power and access to submarines. So by October, the MSDF high officials shifted their focus to sending an Aegis destroyer and replenishment ships to the Indian Ocean. In early October, one of the MSDF high officials asked the CNFJ to request these ships participation.

But considering Japan's constitutional restrictions on war participation and other political factors, the United States believed it impossible for Japan's Aegis destroyers to substitute for the U.S. Aegis vessels and F/A-18 fighter aircraft the United States had been dispatching to provide air cover in case terrorists try to crash a hijacked aircraft into Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, where U.S. forces are stationed.

In the end, the government decided not to dispatch Aegis destroyers, due to considerations for reservation within the ruling parties and the idea of sending the carrier escorts simply disappeared.

But the culture that saw SDF officials selfishly proposing excessive military participation to U.S. authorities remains.

*

The author is a researcher at AAN East Asian Security and Regional Cooperation Research Team and Asahi Shimbun political news writer.