President Kim Dae Jung of South Korea has adopted for the past five years a policy of engagement with North Korea called the ''sunshine policy.''
But it can be said that the Korean Peninsula has been in crisis ever since it came to light that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly confronted the North Koreans with evidence of their nuclear weapons development program.
The sunshine policy was based on the ''ostpolitik'' (eastern policy) adopted by West Germany toward East Germany in the 1960s and 70s before reunification. The sunshine policy was ostpolitik applied to the Korean Peninsula, except relations between the two Koreas are totally different.
A policy of bilateral exchange was set up on the peninsula before even the basics of peace and security were established. Peace between the two Koreas and in East Asia cannot be attained without at least basic security machinery in place.
The North-South Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000, maintains that the problems on the peninsula would be mainly dealt with by the two Koreas. This agreement between the two main players to localize the Korean issue, paradoxically, may have broadened the scope of the problem, bringing in the China and Russia as active players.
China has raised the level of its involvement in the peninsula. Russia, which had been relatively silent over Northeast Asia since the breakup of the Soviet Union, has become more active in the region.
We now know that the sunshine policy began just as the North began seriously pursuing its uranium enrichment project. Improvement of relations led to increased aid and cooperation, which led to more money going to North Korea.
More money from the South undoubtedly helped North Korea's nuclear program and strengthened its military. In this light, the policy managed to hinder security in the region.
The message sent out by the policy and the environment it created were wrong, resulting in the new and present danger on the peninsula. South Korea was alone in prioritizing aid toward North Korea.
It went ahead and engaged North Korea without first creating a cooperative framework with the United States and Japan. Without an effective trilateral framework, South Korea failed to influence North Korea to change its attitude toward the world.
The actual outcome of the sunshine policy was far from expected. Contrary to original intentions, it created a situation in which North Korea can afford to challenge the United States and Japan, propped up by economic support from South Korea and using the South as a negotiating lever.
It is true that the policy has contributed enormously to increased exchange between the North and South. There have been five sessions in which divided families have reunited; families separated for over 50 years have been able to meet.
But we must approach North Korea more strategically. Overtures must be made more tactically, or exchange and cooperation will not achieve their goal. They may backfire.
One side effect of all the exchange and cooperation that the South offered was to enhance the legitimacy of the Kim Jong Il regime. Another is that all the exchange and cooperation may have merely benefited North Korea's ruling elite and added to the suffering of the majority of its people.
Offerings from the South may have heightened Kim Jong Il's prestige, exacerbated the gap between the ruling elite and the people, and robbed the North Korean people of whatever hopes they had of creating a new and alternative society.
The question is how to recognize the North Korean issue and how to approach it. To create a new network or community in Northeast Asia, we must create a set of policies based on the values of freedom, democracy, market economy principles and human rights, that allows the state and people to pursue a common good.
Such policies are needed to urge North Korea to amend its mistaken policies and mistaken political system.
Sunshine policy a cause of current storm
