The author, 65, is former ambassador to Korea and France, and currently a special visiting professor at Aoyama Gakuin University and a committee member of the Asahi Shimbun Asia Network.

At the Institute of Japan Studies at Nankai University in Tianjin, I passed through a gate with a huge sign saying, "Big Welcome." Then I went up to the second floor of a renovated building, where I gave a lecture on the transitional phases of Premier Zhou Enlai's philosophy in his early days, especially the background on his way toward communism.

In August 1919, with a slogan of "innovation" and "reform," Zhou Enlai established a group called the "Juewu Society" together with the progressive youths of that time, including his future wife Deng Yingchao, then Deng Wenshu, who was an artless 15-year-old schoolgirl with a silver tongue.

The word "juewu" in Chinese is literally the equivalent of "kakusei" (arousal of consciousness) in Japanese. It means "awareness" and "self-examination." In fact, back at that time, Zhou Enlai came to his senses and seriously started devoting himself to the reconstruction of his ailing motherland, followed by the turning points in his life, such as studying in Japan, imprisonment, and moving to France.

After the lecture, I invited the graduate students and professors at Nankai University to ask some questions.

One of the students quickly raised his hand and asked me in fluent Japanese, "Why do Japanese political leaders go and worship at Yasukuni Shrine? What do you think about that? Let me hear your opinion."

I thought that the question was exactly like fumi-e (stamping on a picture of Christ--an allegiance test used by Japanese feudal warlords to crackdown Christians.) The question was a testing ground for my consciousness of appropriate consideration concerning the graveness of history between Japan and China.

As I thought I should not easily kneel down and stamp on the picture in front of the Chinese students and scholars, I moved my foot to a little bit different direction, keeping my eyes on the picture.

I asked him, "Premier Zhou Enlai once said that both Japanese and Chinese nationals were victims of Japan's militarism. Needless to say, we Japanese should not forget that the militarism has left an incurable scar on the Chinese.

On the other hand, however, I am kind of wondering why in recent years we have not heard any words from Chinese leaders saying that both of us were equally victims. Why is that?"

Next day, I had the opportunity to hold a friendly conversation with the former vice-minister of the Ministry of Culture, Liu Deyou, who had for years involved himself in improving China-Japan relationships.

"Why are Chinese people still adhering to the past with Japanese?" I asked him with somewhat political overtones. He smiled but didn't answer my question directly, then started talking about his own past experience as follows:

"Even five years after the end of the world war II, I was mobilized to work as an interpreter in Dalian just because I knew how to speak some Japanese. Both the people around me and myself didn't understand why I had to do that. Day by day, I struggled against rip tide in my mind, thinking of and awakened by the true meaning of working for the New China and better China-Japan relationships. Thus, day by day I made a desperate attempt to overcome the past inside of me. It was the road of awakening for a new start."

He talked about a case of personal efforts overcome the past. However, the Chinese leaders and top government officials needed to be aware of how their citizens were dealing with their past as well. It was Ms. Wang Xiaoxian who elaborated on the matter. She was Zhou Enlai's interpreter.

"Every time we encountered important junctures, such as talks on the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, and the China-Japan Peace and Amity Treaty, the party leaders and people in charge were scattered all over the nation conducting a campaign to raise the awareness of citizens and telling them about the importance of the talks and negotiations with Japan," she said in a serene manner.

I believe that the true nature of the complexity of the problems concerning the past between Japan and China doesn't lie beneath the matters of apologies for the past nor treatment of war criminals, such as the issue of Japanese Cabinet ministers paying visits to Yasukuni Shrine. Rather, it is the problem of how each individual makes a self-examination about his or her past, and how leaders address its paramount importance to society. In other words, it is the matter of "juewu" among Japanese people.