SATOSHI AMAKO, 56, is professor of contemporary Chinese affairs and Asian political history at Waseda University and a member of the Asahi Shimbun Asia Network. He is a former president of the Japan Association for Asian Studies.

This summer, when games of the Asian Cup for soccer took place in China, strong anti-Japanese actions occurred in various stadiums. A friend of mine, who has been living in Beijing for a long time, went to the stadium to watch the final between Japan and China and sent me a long letter about it, saying that it was a harder and more painful situation for the Japanese than expected.

That being the case, however, I do not think that the problem can be solved by asserting and acting in such ways as "I will buy into their fight" or "If they become anti-Japanese, then we will become anti-Chinese." The point is what both Japanese and Chinese should learn from the "frenzied anti-Japanese uproar." First of all, let's confirm the "facts" upon which we should base our approach.

Firstly, I would like to point out that, having undergone the process of opening up and reforming the nation, Chinese society has diversified into various categories of opinion. Among them are a group of people who are inclined to be anti-Japanese and nationalistic and a liberal group which emphasizes international collaboration but there are many groups which are indifferent. In late July and mid-August, I visited China but the Chinese with whom I had contact were not particularly anti-Japanese. On the contrary, it can even be said that a "silent Japanese boom" is occurring in China.

Secondly, economic relations are becoming closer. According to August projections by JETRO (the Japan External Trade Organization) for Sino-Japanese trade this year, it is estimated that it will substantially exceed last year's 130 billion dollars, which was the previous highest record, and be more than 150 billion dollars. Whereas overall foreign direct investment by Japan tends to be decreasing, its direct investment in China has shown an increasing trend since China joined the WTO (World Trade Organization) in 2001. Since 1990s, Japanese companies, primarily manufacturers, have shifted production sites from Japan to China, where there are already more such production sites operated by Japanese firms than in the U.S.

Thirdly, exchanges between the peoples of the two countries are intensifying. The number of Chinese people who legally entered Japan increased from slightly over 380,000 in 2000 to a little under 530,000 in 2002, with more than half being newcomers. In 2003, the total number of foreign students in Japan was more than 100,000, of which about 65% were Chinese. In reverse, more than 3 million Japanese visit China annually. Joint ventures between Japan and China and international marriages are becoming ever more numerous, and reciprocal exchanges have already reached the stage where nobody can stop them. Therefore, we must mutually exert efforts to somehow ameliorate existing emotional confrontation.

What measures, therefore, should we take? As a person who has had a long involvement in Japan-China relations, I strongly feel that "a huge gap of misunderstanding" straddles the two countries. It would be a grave misperception to have one-sided views such as "Chinese people are all anti-Japanese," "Chinese are all narrow-minded nationalists" or "China is seeking to become a hegemonic power."

In reverse, as a Japanese, I would like to convey the following message to the Chinese people.

Firstly, following the normalization of diplomatic relations, Japan did not feel that postwar issues had been settled as a result of the Chinese government's renunciation of war reparations but continued to contribute to the development and stability of China in a variety of ways. These included the earnest efforts made by Japanese political and business leaders in relation to the construction of Shanghai Paoshan Steel Works, which symbolized the reform and opening up of China in the early 1980s, infrastructural development such as the construction of airports and highways through the provision of official development assistance (ODA) and grants, and assistance aimed at improving the environment, health and education, as well as at developing human resources. These contributions reflect Japan's sincere sentiments towards China.

Secondly, throughout the postwar period, Japan has reflected deeply on the "war" and has exerted sincere efforts to extend "economic aid to poorer countries," while seeking to be "pacifistic." It is my belief that its international contributions are not a "manifestation of an ambition for hegemony."

Thirdly, I can understand why China undertakes patriotic education. However, the fact that many of its texts draw upon "resistance against Japanese aggression" and are as a result driving the young generation towards being "anti-Japanese" is not desirable from the perspective of the two nations' future. I would therefore suggest that now is the time for China to urgently change its texts.

Fourth, as far as Japanese history textbooks are concerned, they do not necessarily contain the sorts of descriptions desired by China. Nevertheless, it is true that Japan has been consistently incorporating "reflection on the war" into its textbooks. If they are read carefully, it will be found that there is no "anti-Chinese education," even in the disputed "new history textbooks."

The concept of an "East Asian Community," which is being enthusiastically debated these days, can not be realized unless trust is built up between Japan and China. To achieve this, how can we bridge the misunderstanding gap? I hope I will next be able to receive a constructive message from the Chinese people to the Japanese people.