Ministers of Japan and the United States, in an effort to strengthen their alliance, agreed on "common strategic objectives" at a recent meeting of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (the so-called two plus two). They encouraged the "peaceful resolution" of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait and called on China to "improve the transparency" of its military affairs, while reaffirming that they would promote close Japan-U.S. cooperation in missile defense (MD). It could perhaps simply be said that "what should be said was said." However, I thought that a clear indication for the first time in a joint meeting by the United States and Japan of their stance on the Taiwan issue, which China regards as its own internal affair, was likely to significantly irritate China.

As expected, the action provoked a series of criticisms from governmental and academic circles in China. However, what is important now for Japan is to analyze calmly the international situation as it relates to Japan and to establish its strategic standing firmly as set out by the Security Consultative Committee. "Actions rather than words" appears to be the diplomatic stance of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi but the direction in which policy is moving is not clear. People in the political, governmental, business and academic sectors should actively discuss grave issues that could decide the future of Japan and strive to ensure that the country does not head down an erroneous path.

Several days after the "common strategic objectives" were made public, I offered the following comments in response to questions from a Taiwanese journalist.

"It is essential for Japan to try to build up a politically amicable relationship with China because the relationship is of extreme importance from a long-term strategic point of view."

"In that respect, the framework of the Security Consultative Committee should not be made the core component of strategic encirclement of China."

"Nevertheless, the common strategic objectives will probably produce certain effects such as checking China's 'excessive' behavior in such areas as the intrusion into Japan's territorial waters by a Chinese nuclear submarine and unilateral development of an offshore oilfield, and acting as a deterrent against military action by it in the Taiwan Strait."

The following day, when I visited Taiwan to deliver a lecture which had been requested for a long time, I was fortunate to have an opportunity to exchange views with a key figure in the Taiwanese government. I asked him for his views on the outcome of the latest Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee meeting. When I asked this question, I expected a positive reply such as "It was just fine." However, he avoided making a prompt assessment, merely saying "some time is necessary to consider it." He then firmly added: "Cross-strait relations (between Taiwan and China) were at their nadir in 2003 but they improved in 2004. There is a possibility that relations will change dramatically between 2005 and 2007."

Incidentally, the morning of the same day, President Chen Shui-bian, the pro-self-reliance leader, had a meeting with Chairman James Soong of the opposition People First Party, who is one of the leaders of a group that is taking a conciliatory approach toward China. They reached agreement on ten points involving a moderate approach, including "to not change the formal name of the country" and "to not declare independence." What would happen if the top opposition Kuomintang (Nationalist Party of China) endorsed the agreement in the future? China, which adopted the anti-secession law on March 14, would perhaps have to change its posture toward Taiwan.

Few people in Taiwan and mainland China have made projections about the future in the same way as the above-mentioned leading political figure but I thought his remarks were too significant to be ignored.

In working out a diplomatic strategy, one should look at the international community flexibly without being swayed by a fixed idea. It is essential for a country to watch dynamic moves in the community carefully, establish its own position precisely in an historical context and within the framework of the international community, and develop the capacity to work out a strategy. In case that is not possible, the second best policy may be to take sides with "the strongest" of the time.

Japan has been striving for survival in the international community, with the Anglo-Japanese Alliance having been its main pillar before the termination of World War I. Since the end of World War II, it has relied on its security arrangement with the United States. As a mood of uncertainty is prevalent around us in the 21st century, the desire to strengthen ties with the United States as the "strongest" is well understandable. However, it is to be noted that Canada, a neighbor and ally of the United States, is refusing to take part in the U.S. MD (missile defense) system based on an assessment that it would not guarantee peace for Canada.

The structure of inter-dependence has become a matter of reality in the international community more than at any other time in the past. We should remember a historical lesson, namely the "tragedy that we experienced because of the absence of allies in Asia," and be awake anew to the importance for Japan to build up relationships of trust with neighboring countries.