Nationalism seems to be on the rise, and that has been accompanied by strong anti-Japanese sentiment in South Korea and China.
According to the standard explanation by Chinese and Korean commentators, a major reason for the anti-Japan protests is due to the visits of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to Yasukuni Shrine. Koreans and Chinese have traditionally considered the shrine to be a symbol of Japanese militarism.
Heated relations are also fanned by some ``improper'' comments made by Japanese politicians about Japan's history and to the descriptions of that history in Japanese school textbooks.
To many Japanese observers, however, the basic cause of the anti-Japanese movement lies in the tactical manipulation-either explicit or tacit-by political leaders in China and South Korea.
In South Korea, the new Roh Moo Hyun regime has a tendency to make appeals to the populist sentiment. People who support the Roh government belong mostly to the generation that were educated with a strong anti-Japanese bias in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of them have participated in anti-Japanese political demonstrations.
In their minds, Japan is an easy outlet for the political frustration they now feel. This springs from confronting both the old seasoned politicians of the Conservative Party and the much more open-minded younger generation.
In China, the anti-Japanese movement seems to be tacitly approved or even supported by those who want to embarrass the Hu Jintao group. And this can be interpreted as a sign of power struggle within the party. They use the rise of anti-Japanese sentiment as a way to embarrass the present government.
But their tactics echo in the minds of the lower middle-class. This class has felt frustration in the face of the rising income gap and the weakening of the social safety net that existed under communist economic policies.
In other words, the anti-Japanese campaign is in fact a muffled or disguised political campaign against the present Chinese government and a way for the Chinese people to vent.
All these explanations have a grain of truth.
However, now that 60 years have passed since the end of World War II, the politico-social immaturity of South Korea and China should be regarded as the real, basic reason for the rise in Japan-bashing.
This politico-social immaturity has something to do with the waves of globalization that have washed the shores of those two countries.
In the process of globalization, both China and South Korea have intensified their efforts to create new national identities.
In China, the ruling Communist Party has had difficulties in trying to find a new identity for the party after the adoption of the modernization policies. Therefore, it has had to rely more on nationalism in the sense of emphasizing historical Chinese traditions and national pride.
And in that process, the Chinese have had to reflect once again on past humiliations inflicted by Japan.
In the case of South Korea, too, democratization has opened a Pandora's box.
First, the threat posed by North Korea, which had been a reliable way to sustain the somewhat authoritarian regime in the South, has become less valid as a political gathering force.
Also, President Roh's government has, in particular, introduced a populist political strategy and tried to challenge traditional political taboos.
The taboos include questions about collaboration with Japanese colonialism or those who oppressed the democratic movement in postwar Korean history.
In this process, many Koreans have had to reflect, once again, upon the significance of the past colonial rule by Japan.
In other words, the anti-Japanese movement in China and in South Korea is related to the search for a new national identity in their countries.
In that sense, the basic cause of Japan-bashing in China and South Korea should not be attributed to the Japanese political attitude toward those countries. Nor should it be attributed wholly to political manipulation by the leadership of those two countries.
If we reflect upon these basic causes, the resolution of the problem will not be found in a bilateral political context but rather in a wider dimension.
For instance, Japan, China and South Korea should work together to resolve the common problems that affect not only those three countries but also the rest of the world. This could mean a focus on the environment, infectious diseases or international crimes.
These three nations, which have been experiencing remarkable economic progress, should take more responsibility in resolving those issues.
Japan could perhaps play a leading role in trying to join hands with China and South Korea.
And China and South Korea should be more conscious of the need for the economic and political maturity of their nations, so that they might be able to contribute more to global tasks.
In any event, China and South Korea should realize that to make political use of anti-Japanese feelings is likely to be increasingly regarded in the rest of the world as symptoms of their political immaturity.
Japanese leaders, for their part, should be more sensitive to the impact of globalization in South Korea and China. They should be more careful in dealing with sensitive political issues with those countries.
They should also take into consideration that these two countries are still in the process of political transformation or transition: China is moving from socialism-oriented economic policies to free market principles, and South Korea is moving from an authoritarian political regime to a more democratic institution.