Japan's diplomacy with neighboring countries: Correct the distortion brought on by conservative politics

Why do diplomatic relations with its neighboring countries such as South Korea and China loom as an important issue in Japan? That is because diplomacy toward neighboring countries is ultimately the major watershed that will decide the direction where Japan's foreign policy is headed.

In pre-war Japan it was considered a matter of course for the country to take control of the Korean Peninsula. Japan followed a mistaken national policy in its attempt to stage a military expansion into China. In the final stages of its militaristic phase, Japan found itself at war with China, the U.S.A., and Russia (then USSR) at the same time. Japan's stupendous past as such is much too complicated, and too weighty an issue to be explained away using the rhetoric of "holy war" or self-defense theories. Unless we are able to glean moral lessons from the country's history that shed light on our post-war lives and our future path I do not see how we can draw up a decent diplomatic strategy that realizes an enlightened national interest. Of course, though I hardly believe Japan would ever resort to returning to its pre-war militaristic past.

The problem pertaining to the conservative diplomacy that prevailed under the Abe Shinzo administration can be summarized as the lack of a clear vision concerning Japan's diplomacy towards its neighboring countries.

When we look back over the past years we have the "Prime Minister's Commission on Japan's Goals in the 21st Century" that was established under Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in 1999. In its report submitted in January 2000 the commission stressed the significance of "neighborly relations" with South Korea and China. Based on the perception that Japan has been successfully building "its own credibility in Asia," the commission proposed Japan must overcome territorial problems with South Korea and China, bridge differences in ideology and perception, and move to establish a new cooperative framework; while promoting "broad-based exchange on the social level" at the same time. The proposal was a fine epitome of Japan's post-war conscience and wisdom, which was delivered during a period of transition that was taking place after the end of the cold war.

At the time, Japan, seeking to make positive international contributions, had managed to dispatch Self-Defense Forces (SDF) personnel to participate in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) activities. The country was reconfirming its security partnership with the United States, and was busy rendering support to countries suffering from the 1997 financial crisis that pounded Asia. Japan was alert and shrewdly responding to the rapid changes that were taking place in Asia and around the world after the end of the cold war.

Then in 1998, a dramatic historic reconciliation was acted out between Japan's Prime Minister Obuchi and South Korean President Kim Dae Jung. Finally Japan seemed to be taking steps forward in rebuilding diplomatic ties with its neighboring countries--though the China issue, considered the top-most priority issue in Japan's foreign policy in Asia, was put on the backburner for the time being.

However, after entering the 21st century, Japan's relations with its Asian neighbors seem to be driven towards the opposite direction from the course taken during the 1990s.

There exist plenty of political diplomatic issues such as territorial disputes and differences in philosophy and perceptions with China and South Korea that are difficult to solve in the first place. Yet we are seeing a prevailing sentiment-especially in the realms of conservative politics-that maintains the point in dealing with these issues is to thrust stubbornly forward and dig in one's heels, as if that actually defines "proactive" diplomatic efforts. The shift in the political climate seems to have reached its peak with the birth of the Abe administration.

The biggest paradox of the Abe diplomacy was how Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, as soon as taking office, promptly moved to improve relationships with China and South Korea, despite his tenacious views on historical issues and his conservative beliefs. His actions served a certain purpose in picking up the pieces in the wake of the Koizumi diplomacy. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi remained defiant; refusing to acknowledge his visits to the Yasukuni Shrine construed a diplomatic issue. However, Abe's action soon had fizzled out which came as no surprise.

In opinion polls, improvement of diplomatic relations with neighboring countries was often cited as one of the reasons why people approved the Abe administration. This fact is a telling piece of evidence that shows how from the very beginning, there was an underlying basic disconnection between the impulses of the Abe diplomacy and the sensitivity of Japan's civil society.

What is symbolic of the absence of diplomacy toward neighboring countries in the Japanese foreign policy under the Abe administration is his "assertive foreign policy" platform that calls on such universal values as freedom and democracy.

Abe's proposal of forming a coalition of democratic countries actively invites countries such as India and Australia, but does not mention South Korea. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso proposed building an "arc of freedom and prosperity." Yet his proposal is devoid of insight and offers no response to complex issues pertaining to the democratization of China; an issue of major significance that is likely to decide Asia's future.

All this is primarily due to the fact that Abe's "assertive foreign policy" is built up based on deep feelings for such notions as history and tradition. Rightfully, universal values such as free society and democracy underpin liberal outlooks in international politics and diplomacy. But in Abe these values are actually being upheld as slogans for a foreign policy that is based on conservative impulses. The resulting distortion is strangling Japan's sensibility towards diplomacy with neighboring countries.

There are deep underlying historical issues that further complicate matters. If Japan should make a misstep in handling the matter, there are grounds for the strain in Japan's relations with its Asian neighbors to have repercussions spreading to the United States. It is none other than the U.S.A. that has the deepest emotional investment towards Japan's "postwar regime" and the legitimacy of the "San Francisco Peace Treaty" framework that supported its foundation. And herein lies the basis for a coalition to spring up among South Korea, China and the U.S. pertaining to historical issues. If Japan should object to such circumstances and turn its back against all, retreating into its own shell, Japan will end up becoming self-trapped as ever.

Having said that, the conservative diplomacy of recent years is not driven by powerful revolutionary ambitions that challenge the existing international order. Rather, it feels as if the introspective impulses are being amplified by a nagging post-war trauma that laments the country's lack of "independence."

What is needed now is to overcome the trauma by casting an unflinching eye over our past history, not only pre-war but also post-war, and then to rebuild our foreign diplomacy by restructuring relations with our neighboring countries.