The relationship among Japan, China and the United States is the key to the future of security in Northeast Asia. The United States has a pact with Japan for maintaining the forward deployment of its armed forces.

　China, on the other hand, is pursuing a policy of "building a wealthy nation with a strong army'' by importing military technology mainly from Russia, while following its principle of non-alliance with any other nation.

　It would be rather precipitate to assume any deepening of disharmony between the United States and Japan on one side and China on the other. Both Japan and the United States are in favor of engaging China into the global community, while China's primary objective in the areas of defense and foreign policy is to secure a peaceful external environment that would help its own economic development.

　However, territorial disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea are still unresolved. China's nationalism and suspicion toward Japan and the United States have been heightened by such factors as the emergence of a new NATO strategy that values human rights above the sovereignty of surrounding nations, the NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia, the reinforcement of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the start of joint Japan-U.S. research on theater missile defense.

　The current focal issue is the future of Taiwan, which has achieved economic development and is in the process of democratization. The tension and the arms race between China and Taiwan are rooted in a mutual perception gap.

　China believes that the dream of the nation to reunify with Taiwan remains unfulfilled because of U.S. interference, and is becoming increasingly apprehensive over an upsurge of a Taiwanese national identity.

　Taiwan, on the other hand, is growing anxious over Washington's "three nos'' policy and its insistence that Taiwan should hold political dialogue with China. In demanding an equal status for Taiwan and China, Taiwanese President Lee Tenghui said that theirs was a "special state-to-state relationship.''

　To stabilize the Japan-China-U.S. relationship, it is absolutely necessary to stabilize the bilateral relationships that form the three sides of the triangle―between Japan and China, between the United States and China, and between Japan and China.

　While keeping the Japan-U.S. alliance intact, the partners should also be aware of the possibility that they may not share the same view on what constitutes the "situations in surrounding areas'' in their defense cooperation guidelines.

　Even though the United States and China have laid the foundations for regular summit talks based on their strategic partnership, their relationship has repeatedly soured and improved in turns. Now that the United States is the world's only superpower, Congress, in particular, should try its hardest to understand and accept the fact that China is still a developing nation. Simply branding China as the "bad guy'' will do far more harm than good.

　While both the United States and Japan should keep persuading China to resolve the Taiwan problem peacefully, they should not support Taiwan's independence. It is only natural to expand exchanges with Taiwan on practical affairs as necessary, and treat the Taiwanese equally with the industrialized nations on matters such as the issuing of visas.

　Economic exchanges between Japan and China are growing constantly, but the two nations still need to close their perception gap on modern and contemporary history through more thorough education. However, the security issue constitutes the greatest cause of their mutual distrust.

　Japan should stick to its "defense only'' policy and maintain the stance of never resorting to the use of armed force in East Asian politics. China, on the other hand, should accept Japan's political role and willingly agree to defense-related exchanges that will help foster mutual trust.

　One idea is to exchange their experiences in U.N. peacekeeping operations, and introduce them to the public through the mass media.

　Once such bilateral relations have been established, the next step is to activate a multilateral security dialogue that revolves around Japan, China and the United States. So-called Track 2 security talks, underwritten by the governments of the three nations, began in 1998.

　In the last three sessions, the participants have discussed issues including the situation on the Korean Peninsula. It is to be hoped that groundwork will be laid in the days ahead to elevate those talks to Track 1 status. China claims it is still premature to do so, but the United States is eager to get going. And sometime down the road, after further progress in Japan-Russia relations, Russia is expected to join in the talks.

　In proceeding with such multilayered, multilateral dialogue, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) will become one of the key nations. Because South Korea was as much a victim of Japanese aggression in the past as China, China should find it easier to hold dialogue with Japan if South Korea also participates. In that sense, it was good that the first Japan-China-South Korea summit meeting was held in Manila last November.

　Hopefully, the deepening of ties among those three nations will go hand-in-hand with the improvement of Japan's relations with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and the end of the latter's isolation from the global community.

"Three Nos'' Policy

　This is the policy toward Taiwan announced by President Bill Clinton during his visit to China in June 1998. Specifically, the United States is opposed to Taiwan's independence, the notion of "one China'' or "one Taiwan,'' and Taiwan's joining any international organ whose membership consists of sovereign nations.