Asahi Shimbun Asia Network (AAN) recently held a panel discussion to seek opinions about its proposal from experts on international politics and nuclear energy. Following are excerpts of that discussion:

Kokubun：In the light of what has been proposed by AAN's security research team, let us review Japan's history in the 20th century and see what should be the nation's role in East Asia in the next century. Then, let us discuss whether it will be possible to create a cooperative security organization in Northeast Asia in the 21st century. Ideally, our discussion should lead to some balanced insight, especially in terms of crisis management and confidence-building efforts

Y. Suzuki：The AAN proposal points to a target beyond the process of establishing a cooperative security framework. In Europe, the Western Bloc and the former Soviet Bloc worked together to establish a number of cooperative security processes to end their conflict. Disarmament, economic cooperation and human rights were the three themes they pursued after they switched their focus from "maintenance of balance of power'' to "shared security.'' I think it's a proper direction that the AAN proposal points to: We need to promote Japan-China-U.S. dialogue and the creation of a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia.

　But mutual trust must be established before a cooperative security framework can be worked out. Germany offered the use of barracks as training facilities for United Nations peacekeeping personnel and other U.N. volunteers after the U.S. military withdrew from Germany. For a cooperative security framework to be established in Northeast Asia, Japan should at least be prepared to go ahead and offer military bases in Japan as training sites for U.N. personnel on peacekeeping missions in Asia. The same should be expected of all other nations in the region.

　One thing we must bear in mind is that everybody tends to put crisis management ahead of building up mutual trust. This is particularly the case with the United States, which means the Americans will have to modify their concept of security to a more cooperative one. Hungary and Denmark played a major role in bringing the Western and former Soviet blocs together. To get the United States to modify its concept, a relatively minor nation such as the Republic of Korea (South Korea) may play an unexpectedly crucial role. When this happens, we should be able to have a clearer picture of how a cooperative security organization should be run.

Nakanishi：It is unthinkable in any foreseeable future that power politics of the sort that shapes Japan's alliance with the United States will be completely replaced with a cooperative security framework. Even if some progress were to be made in that direction, the question would remain of what to do about the use of armed force. And even when the framework is in place with a set of rules for resolving disputes peacefully through dialogue, what happens if the rules are violated? There will be a choice of invoking some defense pact, such as the Japan-U.S. alliance, or resorting to some enforceable measure in keeping with the cooperative security framework. Still, a global community that never resorts to armed force may be our ultimate ideal, but I just cannot even begin to conceive a scenario for realizing it.

　But having said that, I do see the significance of aiming for a cooperative security framework as our ultimate goal. Specific ideas on how to get there are hard to come by; but if all the nations involved, especially the United States, can change their concepts of security, that alone should be a huge progress. Each nation's concept of security is determined by such factors as its past history, suspicions toward other nations, domestic circumstances and traditional concepts of statehood. It will be necessary to do two things: Each nation must change internally while it deepens its relationship of trust and cooperation with other nations.

T. Suzuki：My specialty is nuclear engineering, but I personally feel that recent security discussions tend to over-emphasize crisis management and pay too little attention to the fostering of mutual trust. In that sense, I heartily applaud the AAN proposal that advocates the concept of cooperative security based on mutual trust.

　The Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) holds the crucial key to the issue of nuclear nonproliferation, but after the firing of North Korean Taepodong ballistic missiles, Japan temporarily withheld the provision of capital to KEDO. Such a hasty decision revealed Japan's ineptness at crisis management, when the government should have reacted much more rationally to prevent any violent swing of public opinion.

　I must say Japanese are far too lacking in the awareness that where nuclear arms are concerned, Northeast Asia is one of the most sensitive areas in the world. The fear felt by the rest of the world is actually focused on Japan, not the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) as many people claim. The world is deeply afraid of Japan arming itself with nuclear weapons. But the Japanese themselves have yet to appreciate that fear.

On Japan-U.S. security

Kokubun：The question is how to see the relationship between the cooperative security process and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. In Northeast Asia, Japan's alliance with the United States tends to be taken for granted. In Asia, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is basically accepted also from the standpoint that it provides a framework for Japan's position in terms of security. How should that bilateral treaty be positioned in the process toward cooperative security?

Y. Suzuki：From the East Asian standpoint, a stable trilateral relationship among the United States, Japan and China would be desirable. Once such a balance has been established, there will be less chance of a bigger nation dominating a smaller nation. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty should serve as a deterrent to what East Asian nations consider a threat. It is always said that while China and the United States have never controlled the entire region militarily, Japan has. Nations of East Asia are practically unanimous in their belief that the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is the only thing that can prevent Japan from ever trying that again. This is the so-called bottle stopper theory.

　If Japan tries to make the security treaty into an alliance between equal partners, the rest of East Asia will automatically interpret that as a ploy by Japan to become a major military power. If Japan proposes to terminate the treaty and move on to a multilateral, cooperative security system, Japan will immediately come under suspicion of trying to bolster its military capabilities to become a major military power. To prevent such misunderstandings, Japan will have to make a truly convincing argument on why cooperative security is necessary now. Otherwise, it would be difficult to replace the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty with a cooperative security framework.

Nakanishi：The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty is the greatest justification for the United States to go on with forward deployment of its military capabilities for the sake of regional security. Most nations in the region regard the U.S. military presence positively, with the understanding that the United States will take some deterrent action in the event of an eruption of hostility. For instance, when China fired missiles into the seas off Taiwan in 1996, Washington sent aircraft carriers to the area. Most nations in the region thought China's action was quite ill-judged. The presence of the U.S. aircraft carriers served as a warning against China and had the effect of containing the crisis.

　I believe it is very important to the region that Japan should make it its national policy to provide forward deployment bases to the United States for the time being, provided the latter sees to it that as much improvement as possible is made with regard to its military base problems, especially in Okinawa. I cannot say anything about the distant future, but so long as Japan provides the bases and the United States keeps up forward deployment, I believe the bilateral alliance will stay for many years even after the cooperative security framework is put in place.

Nuclear umbrella

Nakanishi：The nuclear umbrella issue is about how to guarantee the security of nations that possess no nuclear weapons or capabilities. Even if the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty did not exist, that would not change the fact that some sort of umbrella has to be provided for Japan so long as Japan remains a non-nuclear nation while the United States, China and Russia maintain their nuclear capabilities. It does not matter who owns the umbrella−whether an individual nation or some international cooperative organization. You cannot say Japan is under America's nuclear umbrella because of the bilateral security, nor can you say this nuclear umbrella will be taken away from Japan once the bilateral security ceases to exist. Doing away with the umbrella does not mean eliminating the foundations of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty.

T. Suzuki：It is wrong to jump to the conclusion that Japan needs the nuclear umbrella without thinking through this first. The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty may be necessary even without the umbrella, or the umbrella may be unnecessary even with the treaty in place. The nuclear-free zone concept indicates one policy alternative. I personally do not believe Japan needs the nuclear umbrella. But what I fear most is the possibility of Japan arming itself with nuclear weapons as soon as the umbrella is removed. It would be ideal if Japan could adopt a set of policies that will enable it to maintain firm and friendly relations with the United States, but at the same time have a regional security system to keep peace and stability throughout the region, so that Japan will not need the American nuclear umbrella.

　The Japanese government is inconsistent in its foreign policy regarding nuclear weapons. The government says its ultimate aim is to eliminate all nuclear weapons, and yet it also believes in the nuclear umbrella and nuclear deterrence. In the United Nations, Japan abstained from voting on the nuclear abolition resolution proposed by a disarmament conference of foreign ministers from eight nations−the New Agenda Coalition (NAC). Any foreign policy that eludes the understanding of the general public will never come to be fully trusted. If the Japanese government is genuinely committed to eliminating all nuclear weapons, it can just as easily decide to start working toward the creation of a nuclear-free zone, step by step, and also tell Washington firmly to keep going with disarmament.

　China has renounced first use of nuclear weapons, but this does not have much meaning so long as the missiles are poised for ready firing. There are all sorts of steps China can take to enable verification by satellite such as removing the nuclear warheads from the missiles and burying the silos. The renunciation will acquire meaning only when there is technology and some system to back it up with.

Japan's role to play

Kokubun：What role should Japan play to nurture mutual trust? Looking back on 20th century history, Japan's greatest problem was its inability to properly adjust its relations with its neighbors. While friendly relations have been restored with China and South Korea basically, there is still much to be desired in terms of nurturing overall trust. In the 21st century, Japan, China and the two Koreas will be primarily responsible for nurturing mutual trust in Northeast Asia, but when you think of Japan's role, the problems of history crop up.

　Japan should never forget its history of aggression, but more than 50 years have passed since the end of World War II. Throughout the latter half of the 20th century, Japan has been driven by an economic-civilian power. On this score, Japan deserves a positive evaluation. The question now is how to establish new relations with its neighbors on the basis of the history of Northeast Asia and how to fulfil its role as a non-military power. Y. Suzuki：This will come to the surface with the progress of normalization talks between Japan and North Korea, but Japan has yet to settle the issue of war reparations. It may be a good idea for Japan to commit itself seriously to comparing notes with the nations it victimized during the war and rewriting history accordingly.

　In the process of creating a cooperative security framework for Northeast Asia, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should be considered as a model when considering social development, humanitarian aid and regional disarmament that match the region's needs for social development. The Philippines is in the process of building up a decentralized political structure that will prevent the recurrence of the type of dictatorship maintained by Ferdinand Marcos. Cooperation for decentralization will not lead to international deterrence, but rather to national deterrence that works from within.

　Japan should also serve a major function in the non-military aspects of U.N. peacekeeping operations. Unlike dealing with international strategic conflicts or nuclear- and military-related issues, Japan can start with whatever can be handled easily. Japan must cooperate with relatively minor nations and establish a formula for dialogue between completely equal partners. Nakanishi：There is no question Japan and its neighbors still have some problems with history. But since the war, the Japanese have outgrown their pre-war militaristic mentality, and the whole society has changed, too. Where Japan's relations with China are concerned, I believe more opportunities must be created to let the Chinese see what Japanese society is like today, more than 50 years after the end of the war.

　Japan would be basically correct to concentrate on its non-military role as a ''soft power.'' In fact, even if Japan wanted some other role to play, there is really no other choice. But when a rich and technologically advanced nation such as Japan insists on playing a completely non-military role, there is always the risk that the rest of the world will accuse Japan of avoiding any dangerous or difficult task. There will definitely be a limit, of course, but wherever possible, Japan should volunteer to share some risks with other members of the global community.

T. Suzuki：A criticality accident occurred at a nuclear fuel processing plant in Tokaimura, Ibaraki Prefecture, just around the same time that the parliamentary vice minister of defense got into trouble for saying Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons. These two seemingly unrelated happenings actually share something in common. Nobody in the nuclear industry ever thought such an accident possible, but an unbelievable violation of the law was being committed without their knowledge. The same can be said of the defense vice minister's argument. Maybe similar arguments are being propounded in some quarters, except that most of us never thought it possible because we just did not know.

　Lest Japan begins arming itself with nuclear weapons, every scientist must stay alert and try to stop any move in that direction. This is why we Japanese scientists have started what we call the Peace Pledge movement, which calls upon scientists to pledge to never become personally involved in anything related to nuclear weapons. But surprisingly, not every scientist is eager to join this movement. The main reason is their so-called loyalty to their organization. If the organization joins the movement, they would join. But they would not join at their own initiative as individuals. This means that if their organization decides to get involved in some nuclear arms project, those scientists would automatically participate in the project.

Kokubun：In closing this panel discussion, let me mention the following three points.

　One, since dialogue is necessary in Northeast Asia, mutual communication among Japan, South Korea and China should be encouraged on the precondition of minimum crisis management. And the three nations must make sure that North Korea is not left out.

　Two, with the aim of eventually establishing a cooperative security framework in this region, plan the systematization of this framework over the short, medium and long terms to expand multilateral dialogue step by step, starting with Japan-U.S. dialogue and moving on to Japan-China-U.S., Japan-China-South Korea, Japan-China-South Korea-U.S. (and eventually Russia), and so on. Such dialogue should also be elevated over time from the grass-roots level to the summit level.

　Three, since it is vital that Japan's outlook on security be changed, discussions must be activated to include government officials as well as people in the private sector, scientists and so on. In order to enhance Japan's transparency and help it win the trust of the rest of the world, it will be of increased importance to conduct a fair and accurate technical appraisal of defense issues from the standpoint of security.

Participants of panel discussion

Moderator: Ryosei Kokubun, Professor, Law Faculty, Keio University.
Panelists: Yuji Suzuki, Professor, Law Faculty, Hosei University; Hiroshi Nakanishi, Associate Professor, Law Faculty, Kyoto University; and Tatsujiro Suzuki, Visiting Associate Professor, Department of Quantum Engineering and Systems Science, Tokyo University Graduate School.