Q: Will a process for cooperative security start in Northeast Asia?
A: It is possible that in the first decade of the next century such a framework for international security may be created in Asia. I do not expect a regional security institution like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Europe to be formed in the Asia-Pacific region any time in the foreseeable future. But I do hope that it is possible to bring together an organization modeled after the Partnership for Peace (PFP) in Europe in this
area.
When I was secretary of defense, I tried to structure that kind of an organization in the Asia-Pacific region. It was unsuccessful. But I think it's still worth trying to do and I think it would improve security and stability in the whole region if such an organization could be created.
I think the benefits, if we could do that, would be transparency and confidence-building, as well as an institution that can allow different militaries in the region to cooperate on nonhostile, nonconflict programs like peacekeeping, search and rescue operations, and disaster relief. It will require−to be useful−China's participation in it.
Q: We are entering a stage to begin trilateral security dialogue between China, the United States and Japan on a Track 2 basis. Please tell us how and when we can move to conversations on a Track 1 basis.
A: When I was secretary of defense, I tried to establish trilateral discussions and got interest from neither the Japanese government nor the Chinese government. So I concluded that it was not a bad idea, but it was perhaps premature. It's not a question of whether to do this or whether it's a good idea to do it. It's when it can be carried out.
In the meantime, it's important to work hard on improving bilateral relations, not just U.S-China but also Japan-China. In the last year, our bilateral relations with China have been troubled. But except for Taiwan, I think there is no fundamental reason why they should be troubled.
Q: What about Taiwan?
A: We do not see a solution to the Taiwan problem anytime in the foreseeable future. It is going to be important, first of all, for China to be patient, and secondly for both China and Taiwan to work on improving relations between the two in as many ways as they can−in business, trade and cultural exchanges. But both seem reluctant simply to establish air traffic between Taipei and Shanghai and Taipei and Beijing.
Just as we have counseled China to be patient, we have counseled Taiwan to be patient. Because, if they were simply to declare their independence and declare they're separated from the mainland politically, this could cause a crisis of very serious dimensions; a crisis that could affect more than just Taiwan and China.
We are well pleased with developments in Taiwan toward democratization
and their economic development. But they can destroy all of that, if they act rashly or impulsively politically.
Q: What is the commitment by the United States to the Taiwan situation, for example, weapons selling or military commitment to protect Taiwan?
A: I think that depends on what happens politically. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States is committed to provide or sell to Taiwan weapons systems they need for defense. China is very unhappy about our selling weapons to Taiwan.
My response to Chinese officials I talk with is that if you were not so threatening or menacing to Taiwan, it would be less concerned about buying weapons to defend themselves. Especially when they are concerned about Taiwan getting ballistic missile defense systems and argue that ballistic missile defense destabilizes the region.
I have explained that the best thing they could do to lower the interest in ballistic missile defense systems is to stop deploying missiles across the Taiwan Straits. I see this as being a very difficult period in the years ahead if China continues to build up military forces across from Taiwan and in a sense threatens Taiwan with invasion.
Q: Wouldn't theater missile defense (TMD) stimulate an arms race?
A: In discussing TMD, I want to separate between dealing with a possible threat from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) and dealing with any other missile threat from China, Russia or whoever. I believe the joint security alliance with the United States and Japan and the nuclear umbrella, so to speak, provides a sufficient defense against a missile attack from major world powers like China and Russia. Therefore, TMD
is not necessary for that reason.
My conclusion would be not to recommend Japan to go for TMD and establish a national missile defense to protect itself against war. And the reason I say that is because, as you suggested, it would stimulate an arms race. You deploy more TMDs, the Chinese would deploy more missiles. And where does that lead? It leads to both countries spending more on defense and getting less security.
If North Korea were to continue with their missile and nuclear program, if we could not persuade them to forgo that program, then that's a different political dynamic because the factors which deter other countries might not deter North Korea. It might be worth considering TMD in that case to defend against that.
But the far preferable solution is to persuade North Korea to forgo their missile and nuclear program. That's the strategy we're pursuing. That's the whole purpose of the policy review I've been doing with North Korea. If we're successful with that, that would remove one major reason for Japan to consider a TMD system.
Q: We understand that the U.S. government has been very constructive in its engagement policy toward North Korea. And also the Republic of Korea (South Korea), with its sunshine policy, has been working for a detente solution toward North Korea. However, we have little evidence that shows the leadership of North Korea has substantially changed its thinking. Could you give us any examples that suggest there is hope in negotiating with North Korea?
A: It is not proved yet. When I read my recommendation to President (Bill) Clinton, to Prime Minister (Keizo) Obuchi and to President Kim Dae Jung, I told all three of them the same thing: This is an initiative we should take to determine if North Korea is willing to change fundamentally in its dealings with its neighbors. But I cannot guarantee you the outcome of that. Therefore, using an American phrase, I said to President Clinton, we must keep our powder dry. We don't have any basis yet for forecasting a positive outcome for the negotiations. The benefits of a positive outcome are so great that it is important we try and give it a very serious effort to try to reach that outcome.
North Korea says, quite correctly, that they have a sovereign right to build missiles and nuclear weapons. I say: "Of course, you do. But so does Japan. But Japan is voluntarily forgoing that right because they see their security is better served by doing that. That's a very important example to you.''
William Perry, 72, is a professor at Stanford University and has a Ph.D. from Pennsylvania State University (mathematics). From 1946 to 1947, he was an enlisted man in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and was stationed in Okinawa. He was assistant secretary of defense during President Jimmy Carter's administration and served as secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. In 1998, he became U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator.
Interviews