At the present time, the focus of attention regarding multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia is on the four-party talks between the two Koreas, China and the United States, as well as the six-party talks involving those four as well as Japan and Russia.

Now that North Korea has shown signs of changing its foreign-policy outlook, there is a possibility that the talks might actually take place, so making it necessary to clarify the significance of each of the respective frameworks.

The four-party talks were proposed by former President Kim Young Sam of South Korea, with U.S. support, as a way to draw North Korea into direct talks with the South. Until then, the North had insisted on bypassing the South and building relations with the United States first. The talks were held for the first time at the end of 1997, with their main objective being to change the Korean War armistice into a treaty guaranteeing peace and security.

In contrast, the six-party talks were suggested by the former prime minister of South Korea, Kim Jong Pil, and Japan's former prime minister, the late Keizo Obuchi. Although the idea was brought up again by Japan's Foreign Minister Youhei Kono on a recent visit to China, the talks have yet to take place. There is also a proposal for a six-plus conference, including Canada and Mongolia.

The primary aim of the six-party talks is to build confidence by increasing military transparency through an expanded security dialogue. It is also hoped that the talks will explore ideas for a more systematic approach to various issues, such as creating a regional agreement on nonproliferation, or making the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free. On the premise that detente between North and South Korea will move ahead, the significance of the six-party talks will most likely come to be reconsidered in the long term.

The South Korean government is supportive of such measures for multilateral security cooperation, as it is aware of the need to balance relations with the United States as well as China. For reunification to take place peacefully in the future, it is a prerequisite that China does not disagree. Hence Seoul must take care that China does not suspect the U.S.-South Korean security alliance to be one of containment against China.

In South Korea, the view is quite strong that the withdrawal of U.S. forces after North-South reunification will bring instability. In order to ease such fears, Seoul should make an even greater effort to create a system for multilateral security cooperation to complement the U.S.-Korean security alliance.

On the other hand, North Korea clearly placed a priority on furthering relations with the United States before the North-South summit meeting. The underlying belief was that as long as their relations with America were firm, Japan and South Korea would follow in line. The North may also have feared that if it agreed to a six-party meeting, it would end up being isolated in relative terms.

However, as we have witnessed, North Korea has cooperated in the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) and has joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), suggesting it is now prepared to consider using a multilateral framework when it feels it will not be isolated.

A framework for multilateral security cooperation will be less objectionable to those reluctant to participate if it is not too restrictive. Countries such as the United States, China and Russia have changed their views, and have realized it is better to make use of what they can.

As for Japan, there is a growing recognition that in the middle to long term, some sort of system for multilateral security cooperation is necessary, partly to avoid being knocked around in the power game played mainly by the United States and China. International politics tends to create strange bedfellows in any framework but nonetheless, the creation of a framework - for multilateral security cooperation has great significance.

The U.S.-South Korea and the U.S.-Japan security alliances, both legacies of the Cold War, should be adjusted, at least functionally, to fit the post-Cold War world. U.S.-China relations should also not be allowed to deteriorate to a point where they get out of control. To meet these two goals, Japan and South Korea, although they may each have their own particular interests, must work together to turn the framework for multilateral security cooperation into a firmer system.

This is a task neither Japan nor South Korea can accomplish on their own, but if they lead the way through cooperation, the chance of institutionalizing multilateral security cooperation will indeed become high.