A new framework must be hammered out soon.

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) has announced that work on the construction of light-water reactors in North Korea will be suspended for one year.

The North has declared its withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and has dropped hints it may possess nuclear weapons. Its leaders have gone so far as to reveal the nation has completed the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel that could lead to further atomic arms development. With the very premise for the KEDO project having thus collapsed, the decision to put the reactor building work on hold is hardly surprising.

This project began with a plan for South Korea to finance 70 percent of the $4.6 billion (506 billion yen) construction costs, along with $1 billion from Japan and the balance from the European Union and other sources. If advanced on schedule, the project would have been concluded this year, but only about one-third of the work is done.

Despite that, Japan has already sunk about 40 billion yen in loans into the project. Now, with North Korea hinting that it continues to entertain nuclear ambitions, Japanese taxpayers can hardly be expected to swallow the idea of continuing to pour public funds into such a dubious undertaking.

KEDO was created through the U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework of 1994. Under that pact, the North agreed to give up its operation of graphite reactors, systems that lend themselves to the output of plutonium used as the materials in nuclear warheads. In return, pledges were made to build two light-water reactors, with the United States to supply the North with 500,000 tons of fuel oil a year until those facilities were up and running.

The flow of that fuel oil has already been cut off, a step prompted by Washington's confirmation that the North has plans for uranium enrichment. Now, with the halt in reactor construction, all KEDO operations have effectively come to a stop.

It is clear that the framework agreement was flawed from the start. Any plans to verify past nuclear development by the North were effectively shelved, while there was also no stipulation of how violations would be handled. One reason for this was the strong optimism that existed within the administration of President Bill Clinton that the demise of North Korea was not far off. There was, it seems, more emphasis placed on inking the pact than on ironing out the details.

It is also important to remember the historical role that this agreement has played. The first half of the 1990s was marked by an escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula, with the United States thought to be on the brink of attacking the North. The framework agreement sought to bring this situation under control, and as essentially the only accord linking the two countries, it has served to maintain Washington-Pyongyang relations for lack of a better alternative.

Yet as things stand now, there is no choice but to go back to the drawing board and draft a more effective framework to resolve the nuclear issue. Fortunately, a glimmer of hope has appeared with the establishment of a forum for six-way talks among the United States, North and South Korea, Japan and Russia-an effort brokered by China as the sixth party at the table.

The North has lambasted the decision to halt construction and demanded the United States pay breach-of-contract damages. But it has not yet pulled out of the coming round of talks, which are expected to take place next month. We believe this is because Pyongyang's concerns have probably shifted to a goal of extracting the greatest possible concessions from Washington during the negotiations, which will focus on guarantees of its own national security.

Pyongyang should understand that the KEDO project has only been ``suspended,'' not terminated. If the regime can bring itself to express a sincere attitude, it will still be possible to resume support. But if the North chooses to further backpedal on the issues at hand, the international community will have little choice but to consider placing more specific pressures on Pyongyang to rethink its stubbornness.

The Bush administration has always been skeptical about KEDO, which it views as a payoff to the North for toeing the line. At any rate, the prevailing plan in Washington is to contain the North Korean threat through diplomatic channels. Pyongyang would be well advised to not take the next session of six-way talks lightly and be prepared to put all its cards on the table.

--The Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 23(IHT/Asahi: November 24,2003) (11/24)