The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is losing ground in achieving its goal. North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003, while the de facto nuclear weapon states of India, Pakistan and Israel refuse to join the NPT. In addition, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not come into force since it was adopted by the United Nations in 1996.

To prevent a reckless spread of nuclear weapons, the NPT Review Conference will be held in May at the United Nations headquarters in New York.

The Asahi Shimbun invited three nuclear disarmament experts to share their thoughts about the NPT conference and to discuss ways to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. Sergio de Queiroz Duarte

 President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, Ambassador-at-large for Disarmament Affairs at the Brazilian Ministry of External Relations

Therese Delpech

 Senior Research Fellow at the Center for International Studies and Research in France

Yukiya Amano

 Director-General of Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Science Department at the Japanese Foreign Ministry

Coordinated by:

Fumihiko Yoshida

 Asahi Shimbun Editorial Writer

`For nonproliferation, a combination of national, regional and multilateral measures will work.' YUKIYA AMANO `It would be a boost to the treaty if the United States would ratify the CTBT.' SERGIO DUARTE `Ambiguity is dangerous. ... Saddam was very much responsible for what happened to him. This is a lesson for North Korea.' THERESE DELPECH The Asahi Shimbun

Yoshida: What challenges, risks or crises currently face the NPT regime?

Delpech: Some of the old issues have not been solved, and with time have deteriorated. One is North Korea. There was the 1991 South-North agreement, then the agreed framework in 1994 and finally the six-party talks. But none of those initiatives gave results and now North Korea has left the NPT.

As far as new problems are concerned, one is the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials by non-state actors-the most interesting example being the A.Q. Khan network. A second new element is what I would call the privatization of violence, the fact that even non-state actors are interested in WMD (weapons of mass destruction).

Amano: I do not call the current situation a crisis, but we are facing serious issues. Those are North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, the Iranian nuclear issue and the possibility of WMD falling into the hands of terrorist groups.

There is also frustration among non-nuclear weapon states over nuclear disarmament in recent years.

Yoshida: What could be a remedy to deal with the new situations?

Delpech: Some remedies have been put in place already, for instance, there is the proliferation security initiative (PSI) that is now gathering about 60 countries. This initiative started in 2003 and took shape very quickly. It's obviously not a perfect remedy, but it has proved effective.

Another response to the problem is U.N. (Security Council) Resolution 1540, where states are clearly responsible for whatever activity takes place on their own territory. It's at least a partial response to what I call the ``privatization of violence.''

Amano: The important thing is that we need to address the three areas-nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful use-in a balanced manner. In the nonproliferation area, I believe increasing the countries that conclude the Additional Protocol (of the International Atomic Energy Agency, aimed at strengthening nuclear inspection powers) is the most realistic and effective way to stem proliferation.

The faithful implementation of U.N. Resolution 1540 is another important area. The legitimate right to peaceful use of nuclear energy should be guaranteed, but we have to make maximum efforts to prevent these technologies from being used for weapons purposes.

Yoshida: What is the best mix of approaches?

Duarte: In the last NPT Review Conference in 2000, it was agreed the nuclear weapon powers take ``unequivocal'' moves toward nuclear disarmament through a definite plan of action that comprises a number of practical steps, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). And now we have nuclear-weapons-free zones in many parts of the world that are contributing to stability and nonproliferation in those regions.

So all these things represent efforts toward a better regime.

Amano: For nonproliferation, my view is that a combination of national, regional and multilateral measures will work. For example, if plenty of nuclear equipment and materials are freely circulating domestically, it is impossible to control them to stem proliferation. So first we need to control domestic circulation by enacting laws and regulations.

Export control is an area where we have human resources and experience. The PSI is a useful measure once (nuclear-related) materials leave a country. Regional approaches are also important. We are now working very closely with Asian states to stem proliferation.

Yoshida: There are countries that rely upon nuclear deterrence, while non-nuclear weapon states want to see more radical nuclear arms reductions by the nuclear weapon states. How will we find a compromise in the coming review conference?

Duarte: Five nuclear parties are recognized by the treaty, while all the rest are non-nuclear weapon states. So the imbalance is inherent in the treaty. The non-nuclear weapon countries believe that the situation of continuing reliance on nuclear weapons must be a temporary thing.

Maybe the New Agenda Coalition (NAC, a group of non-nuclear weapon states) will continue to have an important role to play in this year's review conference (as they did in the conference in 2000.)

Amano: If nuclear weapon states fail to faithfully implement Article 6 (which stipulates each state must pursue negotiations to end the nuclear arms race), non-nuclear weapon states will lose confidence in the commitment made by nuclear weapon states. This will undermine the credibility of the NPT itself. Therefore, making efforts to promote nuclear disarmament is not only a benefit for non-nuclear weapon states, but should also be an advantage for nuclear weapons states.

Delpech: In Europe, significant efforts have been made (by the nuclear weapon states).

The United Kingdom currently has only 200 warheads. France has about 300 warheads, but it has closed down its test site and dismantled its fissile materials production facilities. Russia and the United States may not be disarming enough, but at least they've reduced their holdings.

Yoshida: How can we make the NPT persuasive and attractive to countries that have different interests and perspectives on the nuclear issue?

Delpech: At the global level, the conference on disarmament in Geneva should be put back to work after almost 10 years of inaction. A negotiation on the fissile material cut-off treaty should begin soon or the conference will lose its raison d'etre.

Yoshida: The last meaningful result of the conference on disarmament was the CTBT. How will states be putting priority on the CTBT at the coming review conference?

Duarte: Opinions are very much divided on that. There is at least one important nuclear weapon country that has doubts about the NPT. It does not seem possible at this stage to have that country ratify the CTBT. Meanwhile, most members of the NPT are also the members of the CTBT and have strongly advocated the need for the CTBT.

It would be a boost to the treaty if the United States would ratify the CTBT. But given the existing state of affairs, I think the best the CTBT (members) and the NPT conference can do is keep the CTBT and not turn the situation into a confrontation.

Amano: The CTBT is a national aspiration for Japan, and it has a significant, symbolic meaning for disarmament and nonproliferation. Without test explosions, it is not possible to improve the quality of nuclear weapons. Countries that have recently tried to gain nuclear weapons and want to have confidence (in their arms) will want to conduct tests. I would say it will be difficult to reach agreed-upon language during the coming review conference. But we need to make maximum efforts.

Yoshida: How shall we deal with countries, such as North Korea and Iran, who seem to disregard the NPT's goals?

Delpech: The U.N. Security Council should be able to enforce relevant treaties (on both those nations), if the world does not want to return to (a failure like what occurred with) the League of Nations.

Amano: The Iranian issue is complicated and difficult. We must make every effort to solve the problem in the framework of the IAEA. What is most expected for Iran is to faithfully implement all the requirements contained in the resolutions that include suspension of enrichment and reprocessing activities of uranium. But if things do not go well, then referring the matter to the Security Council will be a real possibility.

Delpech: Concerning Iran, Russia is very important. It appears the Russians are becoming more serious about Iran, including issues such as Bushire (a nuclear facility in Iran). If the Iranians go too far, then perhaps the Russians would also be ready to take some action at the U.N. Security Council level.

Yoshida: What lessons can be learned from Iraq?

Delpech: One of the lessons of the Iraq story is that ambiguity is dangerous. Saddam Hussein played two different cards, one by telling the U.N. he had nothing to hide, without providing evidence of that, and another to his neighbors by letting them believe he still had WMD capabilities for deterrence. With this double language, Saddam was very much responsible for what happened to him.... This is a lesson for North Korea.

Yoshida: IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei proposed an initiative for multinational control of uranium enrichment facilities and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities. Will it be on the agenda at the review conference?

Duarte: That proposal will certainly be discussed. The problem that has been pointed out by some of the non-nuclear countries is how much of a guarantee there would be of supply in a scheme of that sort. It is certainly an interesting proposal, but I think it perhaps is not ripe enough for early achievement.

Yoshida: What do you think of ElBaradei's proposal for a five-year moratorium on these facilities?

Delpech: Some countries are using the fuel cycle as a screen to acquire what is necessary for purposes other than peaceful activities. When a covert program (to develop nuclear capabilities) becomes ripe, the country can just withdraw from the NPT and go nuclear, when it is too late for the international community to react.

Amano: First, we must ask, will (that proposal) help to stem proliferation? For the international control system, we are not sure. Being international is not an absolute guarantee that it will stem proliferation.

Secondly, doesn't it negatively impact the legitimate use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes? Most probably, especially in the case of a five-year moratorium, existing or future plans to establish new facilities will be negatively impacted. So we should be more cautious on these approaches.

If the entities concerned really reach agreement to establish a joint venture or establish a new company jointly, and if it helps to enhance the transparency and becomes more proliferation-resistant, we don't have any reason to say no to these initiatives.

Duarte: You already have in the NPT a discriminatory situation, by virtue of the way in which the treaty was devised. If you create further discrimination based no longer on the possession of weapons, but on the scientific and technological capabilities of countries, this will create difficulties among the countries.

Yoshida: What will be the criteria for success or failure of the review conference?

Duarte: Success for me is a result that furthers the objectives of the NPT in its three aspects, disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses, and with which every party can agree. Now, success can of course be qualified-you may not have absolute success, you may have qualified success. And I think failure by the same token would be a complete impossibility of agreeing on any of the aspects of the treaty, but I don't think it would be a disaster, necessarily.

Delpech: What should be avoided in any review conference is a sharply divided house. If the conference could build on what members share-the treaty being a common good-then positive results would be attained.

Amano: If we can adopt a final document, that would be the best outcome. If we can adopt some sort of document, that is fine.

Even if we are not able to adopt anything, that is not good, but it's not the end of the world. In 1980, and in 1990, we were not able to adopt a document, but the NPT survived.

The real failure for me would be if negotiators lose interest and develop apathy or cynicism and give up making strong efforts in the early stage of the conference. The obligations of all signatories to the treaty

Introduced for signatures in 1968, the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) recognizes five nuclear powers: the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China.

The treaty bans all other nations from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons.

The NPT also seeks a reduction in the nuclear weapons held by the five.

The treaty came into force in 1970 and was extended indefinitely in 1995. As of September 2004, 189 states had signed the treaty.

These are the main articles:

Article 1: Each nuclear-weapon state should not proliferate nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article 2: Each non-nuclear-weapon state should not receive the transfer of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Article 3: Each non-nuclear-weapon state should prevent diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.

Article 4: Nothing in this treaty affects the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

Article 6: Each state undertakes to pursue negotiations for ceasing the nuclear arms race.(IHT/Asahi: March 1,2005)