ヒル米国務次官補との単独会見要旨（英文も）

　ヒル米国務次官補の会見の要旨は次の通り。

　――北朝鮮に対するテロ指定国家の解除を巡り日本との間で何が問題になったのか。

　まず、解除というのは長い間、考えられていたことだ。０７年２月に６者協議合意をまとめた際、考え方としては北朝鮮が核施設を稼働停止すれば解除作業を始めるということになった。昨年１０月には、北朝鮮が核施設の無能力化、（核計画を）申告すれば解除するということで合意した。

　申告の核心は北朝鮮がプルトニウムを実際にどれだけ生産したかという点だ。北朝鮮と何度も話し合う中で、北朝鮮がプルトニウムを申告するだけでなく、検証にも応じる用意があるということがはっきりしてきた。このすべての段階で日本政府と話し合ってきた。

　我々は拉致問題の非常に特別な重要性を理解している。拉致問題は３０年前に起きたこととはいえ、日本国民にとっては非常に悲しい出来事として鮮烈に記憶され、そんなに昔の話のようには感じていない。最近の出来事のように感じられている。日本とは非常に緊密に協力してきた。最も大事なことは、北朝鮮との交渉の中で、拉致問題での進展が必要だとはっきりいってきたということだ。

　――日本は解除発表の３０分前に知ったとされているが。

　３０分前ということはない。私が平壌から帰ってからブッシュ大統領が解除を決定するまで、日本政府は日常的に我々と連絡を取り合っていた。驚きはなかったはずだ。

　――（北朝鮮への）日本のエネルギー支援参加がさらに困難になった。

　それは今始まったことではない。０７年２月の合意の時から、日本政府はエネルギー支援をしないということをいっていた。

　――日本の負担分の２０万トンを誰が負担するのか。米政府に提供の用意はあるのか。

　０７年２月の合意ではエネルギー支援は（米中韓ロ）４カ国によって提供され、日本は懸念が解消された時に参加するとされた。他の国の参加を歓迎するということも明記された。全量をどう提供するかというのは解決しなければならない問題だが、解決できると思っている。だが、現時点ではどの国が負担するかというのはいうことはできない。ほかから重油支援を得ることができるという兆しもあるが、他の国が加わるかどうかということも現時点ではいえない。だが、我々は日本政府が抱える特別な問題を理解する。

　我々が取り組んでいるのは、北朝鮮をどう非核化させるかという根本的な問題だ。日本政府が何度も強調しているように、北朝鮮の非核化が持つ日本にとっての重要性を強調したい。もちろんまだ完了していないが、非核化は日本の国益にかなうということを日本の国民に理解してもらいたい。

　――日本はエネルギー支援参加の圧力を受けないか。

　０７年２月の時点で分かっていたこと。もうずいぶん前の話だ。日本には特別の懸念があり、合意の中にも明記された。日本と北朝鮮が進展をとげることを皆が望んでいる。北朝鮮の非核化は日本にとっての利益だ。

　――北朝鮮の核放棄に必要な資金を米議会に求めるのか。

　現時点まで必要な資金を確保してきた。理解が必要なのは、１９９０年代の合意と違い、北朝鮮の特定の措置に対して特定の重油支援を提供してきたことだ。さらなる重油支援は、さらなる非核化を必要とする。無能力化を月ごとにレンタルしているのではなく、買い取っているようなものだ。北朝鮮が無能力化を終えれば、重油支援がからんだ（核施設）解体などのさらなる追加パッケージを話し合うことになるだろう。それが合意の構造だ。何も提供することはないという人もいるが、現実を考えればこれが適切なやり方だ。

　――核放棄段階で日本の資金的な参加に期待するか。

　無能力化、解体を、米国、核保有国だけでなく、６者参加国すべてでやるということが大事だった。実は（１日から３日までの）平壌での北朝鮮との話し合いで、これが一つの問題だった。北朝鮮は検証は核保有国だけで行われるべきだと主張し、我々は各国が参加すべきだという立場を堅持した。日本の参加に期待している。

　もう一度いいたいが、非核化は日本の国益にかなう。非核化は北朝鮮の問題をすべて解決するわけではないし、ミサイルの問題が残っている。非常に重要で感情的な問題である拉致問題もある。だが、日本の国民にとっても関心事のはずだ。

　――検証合意について。未申告施設への立ち入りは確保できると確信しているのか。

　確信している。この点について非常に時間をかけた議論をした。申告した施設だけを見るという検証はあり得ないということを北朝鮮に理解させることが重要だった。追加施設が判明した時に取り組むプロセスが必要だった。北朝鮮と協力の下で、現実的にもそれが必要だが、追加的施設が判明すれば見る権利があるということに北朝鮮は同意した。

　――かぎはプルトニウムの量だとみるのか。

　それが一番大事な要素だろう。プルトニウムで核兵器を作る。プルトニウムを多く持っていれば、多くの核兵器を手にすることが出来る。

　――プルトニウムを把握するために、すでに分かっている検証が必要な未申告施設はあるのか。

　技術的なことに踏み込まずにいえば、プルトニウムは寧辺の原子炉で作られるということが分かっている。製造時期ごとに詳細に分析をした。９０年代に北朝鮮が試験的に運転していた時にどれくらい作っていたのか、ということを検証する必要がある。我々が検証過程に関して北朝鮮との間で得た理解に基づけば、プルトニウム量を検証することが出来ると信じている。

　一つの大事な要素は文書だ。北朝鮮は８０年代半ばまでさかのぼる運転記録を提出した。だがそれだけでは十分ではない。技術者へのインタビューが必要だ。施設に立ち入り、科学的に分析することも必要だ。この３段階の措置でプルトニウム量をつかむことができると思う。北朝鮮が一部を隠して申告し、実際の量がそれよりも多かったという事態になれば、対処できると思う。

　――検証はいつ始まるのか。

　いくつかの検証はすぐに始まる。（北朝鮮が提出した）約１万８千ページの文書はコピーの質などに問題があった。だが、合意に達していなかったため、その点について北朝鮮とやりとりすることができなかった。それはすぐに始まるだろう。

　検証の最も大事な部分は、無能力化の完了後になる。というのも原子炉の検証が必要で、そのためには原子炉を空にしなければならない。使用済み燃料の取り出しは、原子炉がどれだけプルトニウムを製造したかを科学的につかむ重要な機会となる。木の年輪を見るようなものだ。

　――無能力化はいつ終わるのか。

　秋までと期待していたが、またスケジュールが遅れている。今後、数カ月のうちに完了できるだろう。北朝鮮は重油支援をどれだけ早くもらえるのかを気にしているが、我々は使用済み燃料をいつまでに取り出すのかを気にしている。年末までに終わると期待している。年内というのは妥当だろう。

　――エネルギー支援も終わるのか。

　そう思う。重油価格が下がったので、買うのも少し簡単になった。もちろんこれまでも値段が問題だったわけではないが、安くなったので買いやすくなった。

　――次の６者協議ではどこまで進めるのか。

　我々は常に（非核化）第３段階が最終段階になるといってきた。だが、北朝鮮は最終段階という位置づけをしていない。第３段階を最終段階とするのが我々の目標だ。北朝鮮は核施設を解体する段階といってきた。無能力化を越える解体といってきた。だが、無能力化というのは、再処理施設で行われたような復旧ができない段階までするものだ。我々は核兵器をテーブルに載せたい。０５年９月に合意したように核兵器を放棄させたい。中国ともこの点について多く議論してきた。どうなるか見てみたい。北朝鮮では前に進めようとする人がいれば、そう望まない人がいるというのもはっきりしている。

　――検証合意の文書化は円滑にできるのか。

　大丈夫だと思う。我々が示した草案が何を意味しているのかということについて、北朝鮮とかなりはっきりした合意ができている。ほかの参加国にも説明した。今の問題は各国をいつ集めることができるかという問題だ。

　――金正日総書記の健康状態について。

　あまり話すことができない。何かが起きていると言う印象は持っている。だが、訪問してつかむことができるようなものではない。８月の時点では北朝鮮から答えを得るのに困難があった。９月の終わり、１０月に入って答えが迅速に帰ってくるようになった。何が起きているにしろ、意思決定が行われているということだ。

　――次の６者協議はいつになるのか。

　決まっていない。来週はアジア欧州会議（ＡＳＥＭ）首脳会合がある。２７日の週もいくつかの国かにとって難しいようだ。遅かれ早かれやらなければならない。１日か２日でできると思うので、そんなに難しいことではないと思う。

　――米大統領選もある。

　大統領選は短期的には影響は及ぼさないと思う。

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Interview with US Assistant Secretary of State, Christopher Hill 10.17.2008 Honolulu

Q: Delisting of North Korea from the State sponsored terrorism list is now becoming a huge political issue in Japan. What went wrong between US and Japan?

Assistant Secretary Hill: No, I think first of all, delisting is an idea that has been around for a long time and when we put together a package of measures starting in February 07, the idea was that North Korea would be delisted from the terrorism list provided that they, or that we would begin to delist them provided that they shut down their facilities, and then in October 07, we agreed that they would be finally delisted provided the facilities were disabled and a declaration was provided of their nuclear materials. So we worked very hard with them over the course of the winter, that is of ‘08, to try to make sure that in addition to providing a declaration of their nuclear program and what the key element of the declaration is of course the amount of nuclear material that they have actually produced. That is probably the most important element of the declaration. So finally after a great deal of checking with them, a great deal of work really, it was clear they were prepared to provide declaration that included an honest amount of plutonium or I should say, an amount of plutonium they were prepared to, not only declare to us but also have verified. Now, every step of the way, we worked with the Japanese government, because we understood the very special importance of the abduction issue. After all the abduction issue which took place some 30 years ago, is nonetheless very fresh, and extremely sad event, for Japanese that does not feel it took place so many years ago, that in fact it is very much felt today. So we worked very closely with Japan and I think most importantly in negotiating with North Koreans we made very clear that we needed to see progress on the issue of the abductees. So that is the basic shape of what was done.

Q: The day of the announcement, the Japanese government found out about it half an hour before the announcement.

A/S Hill: I’m certainly not aware that they found out an half an hour, because my understanding is that the Japanese government, I mean I know that the Japanese government was aware, from the time I returned from Pyongyang to the time that the decision was made to de-list by our president, that the Japanese government was very much involved with us on a daily basis. So I really don’t think there were too many surprises here.

Q: It is becoming more difficult for Japanese government to provide energy assistance to North Korea.

A/S Hill: Well, that’s not now. That’s always been. Since February 07, since the whole basic shape of the arrangement was laid out, the Japanese government has not a provider of any energy.

Q: Somebody has to provide 200.000 tons of heavy fuel oil. Is United States ready to cover some of it?

A/S Hill: Well, obviously the way the addendum in the Feb 07 agreement was written was to say energy would be provided by the 4 countries in the 6 Parties, that Japan would join as its concerns were met or words to that effect. It also made very clear that we would welcome the participation of other countries. So, obviously how we provide the total amount is a problem that we will have to resolve, but I am sure that we can resolve it. I am not prepared at this point to say which countries will provide additional fuel oil. I’m not prepared to say whether other countries will step in although certainly there have been indications that we could get additional fuel oil from elsewhere. But we understand the special problems that Japan has, and what has been important to us is that we needed to fashion an agreement that could deal with the fundamental issue of getting North Korea to denuclearize. And I cannot emphasize enough, just as the Japanese government has emphasized on many occasions, the importance to Japan of denuclearizing North Korea. We are very aware that the job is not finished, but we also think it is very important that the Japanese people understand that denuclearization is in Japan’s interest.

Q: So do you think that the Japanese government will not face the pressure from other parties to provide energy assistance?

A/S Hill: Look, we knew back in February 07, which is a long time ago now, that the Japanese government had some special concerns here and with those concerns were duly noted in the agreement on going forward in organizing fuel oil, obviously people would like to see Japan and North Korea make progress on this issue. I certainly would, because I have spent a lot of time trying to arrange that progress. But I have no doubt whatsoever that it is in Japan’s interest to denuclearize North Korea.

Q: If you go into the dismantling process, more money will be needed. Is US government asking for more funding from the congress?

A/S Hill: What we have done with the congress is work very closely with congress. And to date, we have been able to secure the funding necessary. I think what’s important to understand about the arrangement we have, because it is unlike the arrangement in the 1990s, we’ve offered North Korea specific amount of fuel oil for specific steps in disablement. And additional disablement or additional fuel oil requires additional denuclearization. That is, we are not renting disablement by the month, but we are buying disablement. So, as the North Koreans get to the end of the fuel oil, and therefore get to the end of disablement, we would look to put together a package that will probably involve additional fuel oil for additional disablement or additional dismantlement. So that is the structure of the deal. I know there are people who question why we have to provide anything for nuclear disablement, but from a realistic, practical point of view, this is the way to make progress.

Q: Do you expect Japan to play more roles on dismantling phase by providing funding?

A/S Hill: Well, I think it was very important to us that the actual disablement and dismantlement of the nuclear programs be done not just by the US, not just by the nuclear states, but by all the parties of the 6 Parties. Frankly, in the discussions with the North Koreans recently, that is in Pyongyang, this was an issue because at first they were insisting that this only be done by the nuclear states. We held out and said no, this has to be done by everybody. So, I would expect Japan’s participation in that. Again, I cannot emphasize enough the strong conviction that we have that denuclearization is in Japan’s interest. It does not solve all of Japan’s problems. There are problems of North Korean missiles, and of course very importantly and very emotionally the problem of abducted Japanese citizens. But denuclearization is definitely an issue that I think should be of concern to the Japanese people.

Q: US-NK verification deal on undeclared site, are you confident that you will get access to those undeclared sites?

A/S Hill: Yes, I am. We’ve had considerable discussions on that issue. And for us, it was very important that the North Koreans understood that we could not have a verification process that involves only declared sites. So we needed a process that addresses additional sites as they become identified. So consistent with the fact that we’re going to have to work with the North Koreans on that, that is, as a practical manner we need to have their cooperation, they have agreed that we have the right to look at additional sites as they are identified.

Q: As you pointed out, the key is the amount of plutonium.

A/S Hill: That is probably the most important element of what we are talking about. Because it’s with plutonium that you make nuclear bombs. The more plutonium, the more bombs.

Q: To find out how much plutonium has been produced, is there any known undeclared site you have to look into?

A/S Hill: Without getting too technical, we know that the plutonium has been produced by the Yongbyon reactor. We have looked very carefully at the different campaigns, so-called campaigns of when plutonium has been produced. One of the issues that has come up is the issue of whether in the 1990s North Koreans had only a test amount, only were testing the reactor, as opposed to having a full load in the reactor. So that difference has to be verified. We believe that based on the understandings we have with North Korea about the procedures of verification, we believe we will be able to verify the amount of plutonium. One of the key aspects is documentation. They provided us with daily production records of the reactor going back to the mid 1980s. But that end of itself is not enough, we needed the access to the engineers and importantly the ability to visit sites and to use scientific procedures during these visits. So we believe we have this kind of triple layer of verification methods that should enable us to determine how much plutonium. It is important that the North Koreans not declare a figure and then hide and then it turns out that the actual amount of plutonium is much greater, and we believe that we can address this.

Q: When this actual verification begin? Is it going to be in the third phase?

A/S Hill: I think some of the verification will begin immediately. Because in the 18,000 documents or pages that were handed over, there were Xeroxing problems and things like that. So we have not been able to really work with North Koreans on that, because we did not yet have an agreement. So I think that will start immediately. Some of the most important verification elements have to wait for the completion of the disablement, because it involves verification of the reactor and that has to be emptied. And the emptying or defueling of the reactor is the key moment in which you can do some scientific procedures to determine how much over the life of that reactor, how much it was producing, sort of like looking at the rings of a tree that has been cut down.

Q: When do you expect disablement to finish?

A/S Hill: Well, we had hoped to get that done by this fall, and obviously we are once again behind schedule, but I would think that sometime in the next couple of months we can get that done. The North Koreans are very mindful of how quickly we get the fuel oil to them, but we are very mindful of how quickly they defuel the reactor, so I would hope by the end of the year. We agreed in July that it would be done by the end of October or so. We’ve lost some time, but I think by the end of year is a reasonable estimate.

Q: Can you finish energy assistance by the end of this year?

A/S Hill: I think so. Because the Chinese and the South Koreans got together to provide equivalent heavy fuel oil, that is, technical equipment and the amount of which was calculated in terms of heavy fuel oil. We are also in a funny way helped by the fact that fuel oil prices have come down so it’s a little easier to buy it. Of course, the issue has never been the cost of fuel oil, it has always been the amount of fuel oil, so it’s frankly a little easier to provide the amount because the price is lower.

Q: How much would you like to achieve in the next 6 Party Talks?

A/S Hill: You know, we have always talked about the third phase being the final phase. But to be very frank with you, North Koreans have not talked about the third phase being the final phase. We’ve talked about that, China has talked about that, ROK has talked about that, Russia has talked about that, I think Japan has talked as well, but North Korea has not. So that is an objective of ours to make the third phase the final phase. I think the North Koreans have talked about the third phase being the phase during which the production facilities are actually dismantled, that is, that goes beyond disabled, but dismantled to the point where there is absolutely no reconstitution or reversal as we saw with the reprocessing facilities. So we want weapons to go on the table for the final turnover of nuclear weapons which were called for in the September 05 statement. We’ve worked very hard with the Chinese on that and we’ll have to see how we do in the negotiations. It’s very clear that in North Korea you have some people who are prepared to move and then some people who are not.

Q: This verification agreement, do you expect it will go smoothly when you put down on the actual document?

A/S Hill: I think it should be OK, because we had some pretty clear understandings with the North Koreans about what was meant by the things that went together in a draft that we did with them. So, I think it should be clear. We briefed our partners all along, including the Chinese on this, so we’ll see. As usual, the current problem is getting everybody around the table at the same time. I think there is some ASEM meetings coming up and so as usual it’s a little more difficult than scheduling a dinner party, I’ll tell you that.

Q: When is the next 6 Party Talk scheduled?

A/S Hill: We don’t right now. Chinese wanted it tomorrow. I asked about tomorrow, it was just too soon. Several of us couldn’t do it. Next week was ruled out because of the ASEM, I think the week of 27th was not easy for a couple of parties. Sooner or later, we’ve got to get this done.

Q: US presidential election is coming up too.

A/S Hill: Yeah, there’s a presidential election around. Yeah, that won’t affect us in near term.

Q What can you tell me about Kim Jong Il’s health?

A/S Hill: I really cannot tell you a lot about it. We certainly have the impression that something happened there, but it’s not something that you could easily see visiting there. I mean, what was clear was we had some trouble getting answers in August and the answers came more quickly in September or to be precise the beginning of October. So whatever happened, they seemed to be making decisions again.